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ABSTRACT 
 
THE POLITICS OF PLACE: THE ROLE OF REGIONALISM IN MID-EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY ANGLO-CHEROKEE DIPLOMACY  
Stephen Matthew Scheflow, M.A. 
Western Carolina University (November 2015) 
Director: Dr. Andrew Denson 
 
“The Politics of Place” examines the role of regionalism in Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy between 
1750 and 1764. Using South Carolina’s colonial records pertaining to Indian Affairs, this thesis 
examines the era thematically. The thesis first explores the rumor of Daniel Murphy’s murder in 
order to illustrate how Cherokee regionalism worked diplomatically in the early 1750s. At that 
point regionalism was the dominant political and diplomatic influence for individual Cherokees. 
The following two chapters focus on the Lower Cherokee town of Keowee and the Overhill town 
Chota between 1751 and 1764. South Carolina built forts at both Cherokee towns during this era 
and the forts’ development and construction are a major focus of both chapters. Keowee and the 
other Cherokee Lower Towns were the most devoutly loyal to the English in the mid-1750s; 
however, the imprisonment of hostages at neighboring Fort Prince George deteriorated their 
relationship with the English. The massacre at Fort Prince George created the opportunity for 
nativist Cherokees to become diplomatically dominant. The transition from regional to 
ideological political divisions within the Cherokee nation represents one of the earliest 
foundations for Cherokee nationalism in the early nineteenth century. Chapter three observes the 
same political transition in Chota. The chapter begins with a description of Chota’s unique 
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experience because of its geographic location and the visitor that traveled to the town. It then 
follows the town, Overhill region, and Cherokee nation’s descent into war with the English and 
ends with Chota’s return to peacetime diplomacy. Throughout, the same political transition of 
ideological divisions supplanting regional divisions is apparent. Politically, regions divided the 
Cherokee nation in the early 1750s. By the Anglo-Cherokee War, in 1760, the Cherokee nation 
was beginning to conceptualize itself as a single entity, and made internal alliances across 
regions over the issue of war. This political change is a significant development towards a 
Cherokee national identity and pushes the historiography on Cherokee nationalism back twenty 
years from its traditional starting point of the end of the American Revolution. 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1750s and early 1760s, the Cherokee’s relationship with the English was 
tumultuous. The two peoples were allies, then enemies, and once again allies. This thesis 
examines the changing role of Cherokee regional identities in their diplomatic relations. Over the 
course of the long decade, Cherokee regionalism played a significant role in determining the 
outcome of the era’s negotiations. Regionalism was initially the most important influence on 
Cherokee negotiations because it dramatically increased the volatile and erratic nature of Anglo-
Cherokee diplomacy. After the massacre of Cherokee prisoners at Fort Prince George in 1760, 
Cherokee politics began nationalizing. The political centralization of the 1750s and early 1760s 
is the early development of centralized Cherokee political institutions. Over the next half 
century, the Cherokee underwent further centralization that eventually contributed to the 
foundation of the Cherokee Nation in the early nineteenth century.  
However, in the eighteenth century, the Cherokee nation was not yet the Cherokee 
Nation. The distinction is subtle, yet significant. In the eighteenth century, the Cherokee 
organized their politics primarily around the town and region. The English bestowed the title of 
emperor on particular Cherokee headmen in order to simplify relations, but the Cherokee people 
did not fully acknowledge this. They maintained their political system based on autonomy and 
influence, rather than the Euro-American conceptions of power and authority. Due to this, the 
term Cherokee nation is referenced throughout the text, but the Cherokee Nation is not. The 
references allude to the conglomeration of distinct Cherokee regions, recognized by 
contemporaries and historians as a common people. While the Cherokee nation encapsulated 
distinct regions, each region maintained its own separate regional identity. 
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 By 1750, both European colonials and Cherokees recognized the Lower, Middle, Valley, 
and Overhill towns as distinct regions. An explanation of the Cherokee regions’ labels is also 
necessary for clarity. The terms region and towns are interchangeable. For instance, the Lower 
Towns, the Lower Region, and the Lower Cherokees are synonymous.1 The Cherokee regions 
did not have the same geophysical limits as traditional political boundaries. The towns within a 
region were its loci of power and influence. This explains why the Valley Towns and the Valley 
Region were synonymous. Each region had a ‘beloved’ or ‘mother’ town that acted similarly to a 
regional capital. The beloved town of a region was not static and other towns with growing 
prominence could challenge for the position. Tyler Boulware notes that it was also “not unusual, 
however, for more than one beloved town to be acknowledged within a particular region, and 
disagreements resulted as to which town was the accepted regional center.”2 He explains further 
that, “Like regions, beloved towns rose and fell depending on political leadership, demographic 
changes, and geopolitical circumstances.”3 Today, there is a consensus among historians that 
these regions existed.4 Hatley’s examination of Anglo-Cherokee relations in The Dividing Paths, 
Despite this recognition, historians have not fully examined how the Cherokee’s regional 
identities influence their politics with Euro-Americans. Thomas Hatley discusses the role of 
Cherokee villages and the different regions in his work The Dividing Paths, however, he does 
                                                        
1 For the Overhill Towns, they are commonly referred to simply as the Overhills, but also 
the Upper Cherokees, and the towns over the hills. 
2 Tyler Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and National among 
Eighteenth-Century Cherokees, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 24. 
3 Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, 24. 
4 The current understanding is that these four regions existed, previously the Middle and 
Valley regions were lumped together and very infrequently the Out Towns are considered a 
fifth region. Tyler Boulware suggests, there is some difficulties in determining Cherokee 
regions, and that “one key is to not treat Cherokee Regions ahistorically or statically,” 
Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, 19. Thomas Hatley and Fred Anderson use the same 
Lower, Middle, Valley, and Overhill regions as Boulware. 
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not recognize divisions between the regions. His discussion of the Saluda Conference of 1755 
between the Cherokee and South Carolina only mentions Anglo-American divisions while he 
represents the Cherokee as a singular people sending “mixed signals.”5 Although Historian John 
Oliphant admits that Cherokee regions “in diplomacy and war each tended to follow its own 
interests,”6 he fails to analyze the significance of that regional autonomy. Oliphant’s discussion 
of the location of Fort Prince George at Keowee characterizes the decision merely as part of 
Governor Glen’s scheme to force dependency on the Cherokee. He includes a paragraph about 
why South Carolina would build their Cherokee fort at Chota, rather than Tellico-Hiwassee. The 
next paragraph begins with the Commons house approval of £3000 for a fort among the Lower 
Cherokees with no explanation as to why the focus shifted from an Overhill to a Lower Town 
fort.7 Oliphant tends to acknowledge the Cherokee regions’ responses but does not see Cherokee 
regionalism as a contribution to the era’s issues. For Oliphant, the volatility of the 1750s was the 
result of “incessant pressure on the South Carolina frontier,” coming from colonial settlers. 
Encroaching Euro-Americans undoubtedly contributed to the turbulence, however, Cherokee 
regionalism was also instrumental. Historians have generally been unsuccessful in examining 
this phenomenon. Tyler Boulware’s Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation is a seminal 
examination of the Cherokee’s organization around the town and region. This thesis uses the 
framework of Boulware’s analysis and applies it to diplomatic negotiations during the 1750s and 
1760s. Since Cherokees from each region had a regional identity, a form of regional factionalism 
influenced Cherokee politics throughout this period.  
                                                        
5 Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of 
Revolution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 75-76. 
6 John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756–63, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 2. 
7 Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 12. 
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Richard White’s The Middle Ground permeates through the historiography of eighteenth 
century Native American-European relations. White’s middle ground is the newly created 
mechanisms of intercultural exchanges between the French and Great Lakes Indians that 
unravels with the United State’s emergence as the region’s dominant power.8 Brett Rushforth 
applies White’s interpretation to French slaving institutions in the Pays d’en Haut region. 
Rushforth finds that over time, “Natives and the French developed a sustained slave trade built 
upon decades of small-scale exchanges of bodies, goods, and ideas.”9 While the relationship of 
the Cherokee and South Carolina falls outside of White’s focus on the French and Great Lakes 
region, his theories transpose nicely over the North American southeast.10 Hatley’s examination 
of Anglo-Cherokee relations in The Dividing Paths, offers a similar understanding. For Hatley, 
the middle ground was a more geographically defined frontier zone that influenced a society’s 
core region, but did not necessarily create something new. He states, “Radical change… 
[emerged] on a single social margin—the frontier—and [worked] its way back toward the center. 
In this case it was in a shared geographical middle ground between the Cherokees and Carolina 
that gradually became center stage.”11 This thesis has elements that agree with both works, as 
there are examples that demonstrate the creation of something new and interactions that change 
the society’s core.  
                                                        
8 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650–1815, 2nd ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xxv-xxvi. 
9 Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 11. 
10 However, this is not uniform across North America as seen in the case of Texas, see 
Juliana Barr’s Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas 
Borderlands, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), specifically pg. 7. 
11 Hatley, The Dividing Paths, 80. 
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Additionally, this thesis fits into the growing historiography of frontier warfare and 
colonial violence. Historians Peter Silver and John Grenier both find that frontier warfare with 
Native Americans significantly influence Euro-American society. Silver examines the rhetoric of 
Indian hating in contemporary literature and finds that it works as a racial distinguisher. He 
argues that the colonial experiences and representations of Indian warfare influenced how Euro-
Americans approached Native Americans into the twentieth century.12 While Silver’s work 
focuses on Euro-American society, Grenier’s examines their military tactics. Grenier finds that 
the experience of frontier Indian wars led to a new acceptance of scorched earth tactics and a 
willingness to engage enemies logistical resources rather than their actual forces.13 Wayne Lee 
analyzes the legitimacy of violence in eighteenth century North Carolina and echoes the findings 
of Silver and Grenier. Lee contends that there were clear distinctions between acceptable uses of 
force against Native Americans or European enemies by colonial Americans.14  
Regionalism and factionalism are two terms that need defining. Foremost, regionalism is 
merely geographic factionalism. The factionalism between regions is not necessarily anything 
greater than a difference of opinion.15 The significance of the disparate views can vary greatly 
but as Phil Buckner points out, “regionalism frequently arises out of a desire to be included 
within the larger political and cultural community.”16 Within the Cherokee nation, regions may 
                                                        
12 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). 
13 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
14 Wayne Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence 
in Riot and War, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001). 
15 An anachronistic analogy would be modern political parties both ‘fighting’ for the greater 
good of the nation, but the other party is wrong. If the parties follow geographic lines this is 
an easy, albeit over simplified, way to conceptualize Cherokee regional factionalism. 
16 Phillip A. Buckner, “Limited Identities and Canadian Historical Scholarship: An Atlantic 
Provinces Perspective,” Journal of Canadian Studies. (April 1988), vol. 23, no. 1/2, 194. 
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also ally themselves against a particular region on a particular issue. Wanting a trader in one 
region over another does not carry the same weight as the decision to go to war or not, but both 
are examples of factionalism. The Cherokee’s understanding of regional autonomy also caused 
factionalism. Since each region was autonomous, individual regions traditionally went to war 
and made peace independently. This causes diplomatic issues in 1753 when Governor Glen tries 
to establish peace between the entire Cherokee and Creek nations. Chapter 3 examines this 
particular instance further. In essence, regionalism and factionalism are nearly synonymous, but 
not completely and for the Cherokees, geography primarily delineated their factionalism before 
the Anglo-Cherokee War.   
Anglo-Americans had similar divisions to Cherokee regionalism. Historian, Michael P. 
Morris states that Native Americans were able to use and manipulate rivalries. He writes, 
“Intercolonial and international rivalries in North America empowered various tribes to make 
their own trade demands on colonial government. These governments often acquiesced to Indian 
demands from fear of losing their Indian allies and trade to rival colonies or nations.” 17 The 
rivalry between the governors of South Carolina and Virginia primarily affected the Cherokee 
nation during the 1750s and 1760s. Additionally, Governor James Glen of South Carolina was 
frequently at odds with the Commons House of Assembly.18 This meant that Anglo-Americans 
were also far from unified negotiators with the Cherokee.  
Historical analysis of the Cherokee people in the eighteenth century presents many 
challenges. Most of the primary source materials come from negotiations between the Cherokee 
nation and South Carolina. The two main issues are the evidentiary base and the spelling used in 
                                                        
17 Michael P. Morris, Bringing of Wonder, 9. 
18 W. Stitt Robinson, James Glen:From Scottish Provost to Royal Governor of South Carolina, 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 64-66, 108. 
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the sources. It is necessary to address these issues in order to understand how to assuage the 
issues.   
   The Cherokees in the eighteenth century did not have a written language and therefore, 
they left no written documents solely of their own accord. Many of the sources are the written 
statements and correspondence from Euro-Americans to the Cherokee. The Cherokee did not 
receive these sources verbatim though. Colonial translators converted the documents and 
speeches into the Cherokees’ native language. By the mid- to late-eighteenth century, however, 
the Cherokees had been consistently interacting with British colonials for over one hundred 
years. It is highly improbable that translators could not work effectively after such prolonged 
contact and the Cherokee would offer their approval of certain “linguisters” as honest men to the 
Governor.19 Thus, the Cherokees assumedly understood most of the meanings of the original 
English documents despite lacking perfect translations.  
 The second concern, that of spelling, is a multifaceted issue. First, in terms of style, place 
names in this analysis will generally conform to modern spellings for the sake of uniformity. An 
issue with this methodology is that some eighteenth century spellings differ radically from their 
modern counterparts. Cross-referencing additional sources is required to ensure the correct 
location is being examined. The same principals will guide the usage of names. Cherokee 
nomenclature allows individuals to have multiple names. For example, the Tasitte of Hywassee 
becomes the Tacite of Hiawasee; the Raven of Hywassee becomes the Raven of Hiawasee. In the 
                                                        
19 Nathaniel Sheidley discusses the effectiveness of translators during the Henderson 
secession of 1775 in, “Hunting and the Politics of Masculinity in Cherokee Treaty-making, 
1763–75,” in Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850, ed. 
Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 
167, 167-8. Captain Raymond Demere to Governor Lyttelton, July 13, 1756, in Colonial 
Records of South Carolina, edited by McDowell, Jr., 135-139, 138. 
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previous example, the Tacite and Raven of Hiawasee are different names for the same individual 
and their use interchangeable. Just as the names of places and people, the terms used to describe 
them also present a particular challenge.  
William L. McDowell, Jr.’s edited collections, Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, 
1750–1754 and Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, 1754–1765 are quoted extensively 
throughout the thesis. In his preface, McDowell explains that he only made minimal edits to the 
original text of the documents contained within, and usually only for uniformity, such as the 
capitalization of the first word of sentences.20 Quotes taken from McDowell’s collections 
maintain this tradition and are used directly. Some terms from the original documents have been 
adopted into the modern lexicon. The two most significant terms are “bad talks” and “good 
talks.”21 In the mid-eighteenth century, the correspondence between colonial officials and the 
Cherokee frequently use these terms. Bad talks refer to an array of disagreeable messages. 
Rumors of Cherokee violence against Anglo-Americans, or Cherokee relations with the French, 
were both referred to as bad talks. A rumor among the Cherokee that the English are preparing to 
attack the nation was also considered bad talks. Essentially, any spoken or written word, truthful 
or rumor, which was detrimental to the Anglo-Cherokee relationship, was considered bad talks. 
Good talks were simply the opposite. Generally, during the 1750s and 1760s, bad talks ensued 
for various reasons and then efforts were made to return to good talks.  
                                                        
20 William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., Documents Relating to Indian Affars, May 21, 1750–August 7, 
1754, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 68-71, 178-184, 184-187, 187-
196, hereafter cited as DRIA I, v-vi. 
21 See DRIA I, 68-71, 178-184, 184-187, 187-196, and William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., Colonial 
Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indians Affairs, 1754–1765, 1970, reprint, 
(Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives & History, 1992), 159-161, 214-224, 
240-243, 462-463, 470-473, hereafter cited as DRIA II. 
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Two more terms from the primary sources that need explaining are “the norwards 
Indians,” and “the path.”22 First, the norwards Indians is simply Indians to the north of the 
Cherokee. The term is generally nonspecific of which Indian people it is referencing. The 
documents use the term interchangeably for the Shawnee, the Nottoway, the Cayuga, and the 
Iroquois Confederacy. When ascertaining what the specific Indian people documents were 
referencing is possible, their name is given. It is also pertinent to note that the primary sources 
frequently mention the Savannah Indians, which was a contemporary name for the Shawnee.  
Second, when the documents refer to the path it is a reference to the Cherokee Trading 
Path. The path connected Charleston, South Carolina to the Lower Cherokee town of Keowee. 
References to the path were usually in regards to the health of the Cherokee-South Carolina 
relationship. When the path was clear and bright, the relationship was good and strong.23 When 
the path was black, dark, or bloody, relations were troublesome.24 
The final term that needs defining is the politics of place. This modern term has 
significant scholarship surrounding it. This thesis, however, uses it separately from the modern 
usage in political sciences. Here, the politics of place denotes an instance in which a regional 
identity is a primary influence or tool used during diplomatic negotiations or decisions.   
This thesis is organized in three thematic chapters that each flow chronologically. 
Chapter 1, “The ‘Murder’ of Daniel Murphy,” examines how the Cherokee and South Carolina 
used regionalism during the aftermath of the Cherokee trader’s rumored murder. The chapter 
establishes regionalism as an important diplomatic influence within the Cherokee nation in 1751. 
                                                        
22 For norwards see, DRIA I, 179-181, 488, and DRIA II, 15-6, 43, 203, 347-8, 382, 414; For 
the path see, DRIA I, 436-446, and DRIA II, 182, 443-44, 491-492. 
23 DRIA II, 182, 443-44. 
24 DRIA I, 436-446, and DRIA II, 443-444, 491-492. 
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It also explains how the Cherokees used their regionalism diplomatically after the spread of the 
rumor. The chapter shows how Cherokee regionalism influenced the subsequent treaty 
negotiations with South Carolina, internal divisions among the Cherokee nation, and the 
Cherokee’s relationships with Virginia and the French.  
Chapters 2 and 3 respectively examine the experience of the Lower Town Keowee and 
Overhill Chota, from the conclusion of the Daniel Murphy affair until 1762. Chapter 2, 
“Gateway to the Cherokee Nation,” investigates the role of regionalism on Keowee’s rise from a 
declining town in 1750 to its status as the epicenter of Cherokee-South Carolinian trade by 1762. 
The chapter emphasizes South Carolina’s establishment of Fort Prince George adjacent to the 
town on its influential growth, the region’s geographic proximity to South Carolina, and its 
unique experience as the most southern Cherokee region. The first two thirds of the chapter 
highlight the significance of regionalism in obtaining the fort and Keowee’s role in the French 
and Indian War. The final third of the chapter focuses on the changing role of regionalism during 
the Anglo-Cherokee War. In Keowee and the Cherokee nation, the war diminished regional 
influences as Cherokee politics underwent nationalization. The chapter concludes with the 
establishment of Fort Prince George at Keowee as the recognized center of trade in South 
Carolina’s 1762, “Act to Regulate the Cherokee Trade.”  
Chapter 3, “The Cherokee Capital City,” follows the same format as chapter 2 and 
explores regionalism in Chota. This chapter emphasizes the Anglo-American designation of Old 
Hop, a Chota headman, as the Cherokee emperor and his town the nation’s capital. Chapter 3 
underlines the remote and mountainous geography of the Overhill region’s influence on Chota 
headmen’s regional identity. The region’s geography allowed for great geopolitical autonomy 
from South Carolina and allowed the headmen of Chota the unique opportunity of courting 
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Virginian and French representatives. The chapter also contrasts Chota’s unique experience in 
the northernmost Cherokee region against Keowee and the Lower Town’s experiences. The 
chapter begins with an examination of the contribution of the presence of foreigners among the 
Overhill Cherokee’s regional identity. It then documents the Cherokee’s descent to war and 
reaffirms the conclusion from chapter 2 that the Anglo-Cherokee War nationalized Cherokee 
politics and lessened the influence of regional identities. The chapter closes with Chota and the 
Overhill Towns’ struggle to reestablish peace and maintain regional dominance in an 
increasingly national Cherokee nation. 
The conclusions reached in chapters 2 and 3 are premised on an understanding of 
Cherokee regionalism at the beginning of the period in the early 1750s. Due to this, the thesis 
begins with an examination of Cherokee regionalism in the early 1750s. Chapter 1’s analysis of 
the supposed murder of Daniel Murphy in 1751, illustrates how regionalism influenced the 
politics and diplomacy of the Cherokee nation. The diplomatic affair created by the rumored 
murder elicited displays of regionalism from the various Cherokee regions involved. 
Understanding the impact of regionalism within the Cherokee nation during the 1750s is required 
to fully comprehend the dramatic changes Cherokee politics and diplomacy underwent over the 
course of the next decade. 
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THE ‘MURDER’ OF DANIEL MURPHY:  
REGIONALISM IN THE MID-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ANGLO-CHEROKEE FRONTIER 
 
 James Francis knew the importance of what he wrote on May 4, 1751. John Bryant gave 
his deposition on the affairs in the Cherokee Middle Towns to Mr. Francis and it was a startling 
report. Bryant told Francis that Cherokees murdered four white men, including the traders Daniel 
Murphy and Bernard Hughs.1 Bryant’s deposition was not the only report of the Cherokees 
murdering Murphy, nor the earliest. Similar stories are told in multiple accounts from late April 
and early May 1751 and the murder is even mentioned as late as May 1752. The crimes occurred 
in the Lower Town of Oustenalley and the Out Towns along the Tuckasegee and Oconaluftee 
Rivers. 2 South Carolina’s experience during the Yamasee War between 1715 and 1717 gave the 
colony reason for concern regarding Bryant’s deposition. Carolina had hoped to forge an alliance 
with the Cherokees during the war. The possibility of an alliance broke down when the colony 
learned of the Cherokees murder of Carolinian traders.3 The Cherokees eventually sided with 
South Carolina half way through the war, but the murder of traders was a clear declaration of 
                                                        
1 “Deposition of John Bryant,” Jas. Francis, memorandum, May 4, 1751, in Colonial Records of 
South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indians Affairs, May 21, 1750–August 7, 1754, edited by 
William L. McDowell, Jr., 1958, reprint, (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives & 
History, 1992), 41, hereafter cited as DRIA I. 
2 Governor Glen to the Head Men of Oustenalley, June8, 1751, in DRIA I, 81;The Out Towns are 
generally not considered their own region but they are a recognized set of towns along the 
Tuckasegee River, about 15 miles northeast of the core Middle Towns, Tyler Boulware, 
Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and National among Eighteenth-Century 
Cherokees, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 20. 
3 Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of 
Revolution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 22-23; William L. Ramsey, The 
Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 132. 
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war. This memory was cause for concern three and a half decades later. This rumor had the 
power to start a war between two very important trading partners.  
 It is unknown when the murderous accounts were realized as false. As early as May 21, 
1751, John Williams, “Master Trader in the Cherokee Nation,” swore “Murphy was then living 
and never hurted or damaged in Person or Goods.”4 Daniel Murphy appears in the documentary 
record as a living man more than a year after the event supposedly took place.5 Francis 
understood the meaning of murdered traders and it was a dreadful thought and because of the 
action’s implications information regarding a murdered trader spread rapidly.6 Indians along the 
Anglo frontier in North America often murdered traders as a prelude to war and South Carolina 
experienced this decades earlier.   
 When Governor Glen of South Carolina learned of the rumor he was aware that it was a 
dangerous situation. Glen knew there needed to be action. He quickly ordered all traders out of 
the Cherokee country.7 There was no need to keep traders in hostile territory and the Cherokees 
had to recompense their transgressions. South Carolina’s Commons House imposed an embargo 
on the Cherokees, despite Glen’s concerns that an embargo would alienate the Cherokees by 
giving their rivals, the Creeks, an unfair advantage. The initial rumor and the subsequent 
embargo led to a flurry of diplomatic affairs between Cherokee headmen and the colonial 
                                                        
4 Affidavit of John Williams, May 21, 1751, 19-20, in DRIA I. 
5 Lud. Grant to Governor Glen, May 3, 1752, in DRIA I, 261. 
6 The murdering of traders was a common preemptive to, or, declaration of war with indigenous 
peoples on the eighteenth century colonial south. Anyone involved in the Indian trade, colonial 
government, press, and anyone with any understanding of Native Americans would have 
understood its meaning. Peter Silver’s Our Savage Neighbors examines the fear of Indians 
within colonial society during the eighteenth century more in depth.  
7 W. Stitt Robinson, James Glen: From Scottish Provost to Royal Governor of South Carolina, 
(Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 89. 
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government. This explosion of diplomacy continued even after the rumor of his murder was 
dispelled.  
 Daniel Murphy’s “murder” illustrated the volatility of Anglo-Cherokee relations in the 
mid-eighteenth century. The fleeting rumor quickly revealed the factional differences within both 
Cherokee and South Carolina society. The Lower Town and Overhill Cherokees were quick to 
reiterate their own regional independence. The South Carolina Assembly and royal governor 
James Glen sought different diplomatic solutions to resolve the crisis. Both Cherokee and South 
Carolina societies muddled through the affair amongst themselves, as well as with each other. 
The rumor showed that factionalism within the two societies helped generate the erraticism of 
their mid-eighteenth century relationship. 
 The central character of the rumor was Daniel Murphy. Very little is actually known 
about Murphy. He enters the documentary record on April 28, 1751, in the first mention of his 
murder.8 As quickly as he appears, he vanishes from the record after May 4, 1752.9 Very little 
information is gleaned from the limited sources that do appear in this brief stretch of time. What 
is known from the records is that he was a South Carolinian Cherokee trader. He formerly lived 
in a town named “Canutry” and later planned “to settle with his Slaves, Horses, and Leather,” at 
the New Cherokee settlement of Aulola on the Holston River in modern day Tennessee.10 
Essentially nothing else is known about him. Perhaps the move to settle suggests that Murphy 
was looking for a wife, or possibly had taken a Cherokee wife, but nothing is certain. Despite 
                                                        
8 Cornelius Doughart to James Maxwell, April 28, 1751, in DRIA I, 82-83. 
9 Lud. Grant to Governor Glen, May 4, 1752, in DRIA I, 238. 
10 Lud. Grant to Governor Glen, May 3, 1752, in DRIA I, 261; William R. Reynolds, Jr., The 
Cherokee Struggle to Maintain Identity in the 17th and 18th Centuries, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland 
& Company, 2015), 54. 
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knowing very little about Daniel Murphy the man, his supposed murder offers valuable insights 
into the Cherokee-South Carolina relationship of the early 1750s. 
 At this time, Anglo-Cherokee relations were undergoing changes. First, the Overhill 
towns Hiwassee-Tellico and Chota, continued to compete over the dominance of Cherokee 
diplomatic affairs.11 Tyler Boulware reminds twenty-first century observers that “beloved towns 
rose and fell depending on political leadership, demographic changes, and geopolitical 
circumstances.”12 In the 1750s, “Chote was particularly active as… Old Hop… sent overtures to 
the French at Fort Toulouse and dispatched the Little Carpenter… to Williamsburg to negotiate 
for Virginia trade,” in an effort to “preserve their [Cherokee] independent operations.”13 Old 
Hop’s decisions to begin exploring alternative possibilities aided in his and Chota’s ascendency 
to prominence within the Cherokee-Anglo relationship. The Cherokee’s willingness to explore 
alternate trade sources also illustrated broader geo-political realities of the times. 
 The French at Fort Toulouse posed a significant risk to British interests in the North 
American southeast. Through Fort Toulouse, the French built and maintained significant ties to 
the Cherokee’s traditional enemies the Creeks. South Carolina maintained a monopoly of the 
Cherokee trade, so Old Hop’s overtures to the French represented a threat.14 Glen also protested 
the delegation sent to Virginia, upon which the acting governor of Virginia withdrew his support 
for sending Virginian traders westward.15 So the Cherokee-South Carolina relationship, despite 
its significant and peaceful length, was threatened by the politics of the colony and the 
                                                        
11 Robinson, James Glen, 89-90. 
12 Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, 24. 
13 Robinson, James Glen, 90. 
14 John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier 1756–63, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 2001), 9. 
15 Robinson, James Glen, 90. 
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international rivalries of the colonial powers. This all occurred during the build up to the contest 
for the continent as control of the Ohio River Valley was being contested between the English 
and French. 
 The ‘murder’ of Daniel Murphy is merely a drop in the ocean of colonial disputes in the 
North American southeast, but it reveals the complex nature of the relationship between the 
Cherokees and South Carolina. The ways in which the Cherokees and South Carolina dealt with 
this relatively minor crisis helps explain the course of Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy over the 
coming decades and also reveals the great importance of region within Cherokee-Anglo 
diplomacy. 
 In 1751, reports of the murder of a white man in the Cherokee interior emanated from the 
Cherokee Middle Towns. The reports stated that a colonial trader, Daniel Murphy was murdered 
and that Bernard Hughs’ goods were stolen from him. Some reports stated Cherokees killed him, 
and others claimed it was a false report, or that he merely received wounds.16 The significance of 
the possible murder of the colonial trader, Daniel Murphy, is in how those who commented on 
the event voiced and directed their commentary. The hasty diplomacy illustrated the transient 
nature of Anglo-Cherokee politics and how regionalism played an important role in negotiations. 
 The ‘murder’ in the Lower Towns, and the robberies in the Out Towns caused an 
outbreak of hysteria in South Carolina that needed to be dealt with. Based on the initial reports of 
theft and murder, South Carolina sought to punish the individual offenders for their actions. The 
towns where the actions took place were witnessing a growing resentment towards the English 
                                                        
16 Killed: “Deposition of John Bryant,” Jas. Francis, memorandum, May 4, 1751, 41; “Affidavit 
of William Thomson,” council chamber, 51; False Report: Skier Rosskee to John Dunning, 
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Wounded: “Governor Glen’s Talk to the Cherokees,” November, 13, 1751, 43-45 and 156-159; 
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while regions removed from the epicenters of violence generally maintained their friendly 
relations with the English.17 The Lower Town’s growing resentment resulted from war with 
neighboring Indians and the disbanding of the region’s towns.18 Due to incessant enemy raids, 
many of the Lower Towns relocated to the safety of the Cherokee interior. The move was not 
unprecedented but also not very common. The British pursuit of justice during this time 
illuminates the regional factionalism within Cherokee society. 
 On June 8, 1751, Governor James Glen of South Carolina sent out a flurry of 
correspondence. He wrote six letters in total but the letters took two distinct forms. What form a 
letter took depended upon the recipient’s geographic location within the Cherokee nation. The 
first and more common form took a reprimanding tone and these were addressed to the towns of 
Kituhwa, Tuckasegee, Kewochee, and the Head Men of Tomasee, and Oustenally. All of these 
towns are either Out or Lower Towns, where the hostilities had taken place. In the second type of 
letter the tone was far more complimentary towards the recipients. Glen sent this type of letter to 
Tacite of Hiwasee and the “Cherokee Emperor,” Old Hop, in the Valley and Overhill regions 
respectively.19 This reflects the differential views South Carolina had toward the Cherokee 
regions in the early 1750s.  
 The two different letter templates are a result of the Cherokee’s intense regionalism. 
Clearly, the supposed transgressions were regional in nature, but had national implications. 
                                                        
17 Old Hop and Chota did send overtures to the French and Virginia, however, they maintained 
their friendly connections with South Carolina. 
18 Talk from Skiogusto Kehowe and the Good Warrior Estuttowe to Governor Glen, April 15, 
1752, in DRIA I, 247. 
19 Governor Glen to the Cherokee Emperor, June 8, 1751, in DRIA I, 173. The “Emperor is 
assumed to be from the Overhill Region because of the region’s association with the ‘first 
Cherokee Emperor,’ Moytoy at Tellico, and the rise of Chota to national prominence during this 
era, see Champagne, Social Order and Political Change, 56-59. Oliphant, Peace and War on the 
Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 7-8. Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, 24, 58, 76. 
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Murphy’s ‘murder’ revealed that the regionalism of Anglo-Cherokee politics also influenced the 
relationship’s instability. Despite the maintaining of friendly relations by the non-offending 
Cherokee regions, the Overhills still found it pertinent to explore options outside of South 
Carolina because of possible consequences from the offending regions actions. The ‘murder’ was 
not the sole reason for the Cherokees exploring other options, but the French presence 
exacerbated the growing English concern of losing their valuable allies. 
One of the letters that Governor Glen of South Carolina wrote was to Tacite of Hiwasee 
in the Cherokee Valley Towns. In the letter, Governor Glen discusses the events; “One of our 
Inhabitants [Daniel Murphy] going lately to the Cherokee Nation was wounded… with an Intent 
to kill him…. The three Towns, [Kituhwa], [Stecoe], and [Connutory] have behaved remarkeably 
ill; here our Traders’ Stores were plundred, and their Goods and Skins publickly divided 
amongst the People.”20 Governor Glen wanted to punish the individuals from those towns who 
carried out the crimes. This pursuit of justice raised concerns for the neighboring Lower Towns. 
Glen also commends the Tacite for preventing his towns “from being infected with the Madness 
of others,” and endeavoring “to cure and correct the Disorders of others.”21 The “Madness of 
others,” which Governor Glen refers to is the belief that was spreading through the Cherokee Out 
and Lower Towns was that the South Carolina forces near the border were being prepared to 
actually attack, rather than protect, the Cherokees. 
Glen sent a similar flurry of letters to the officers in the South Carolina frontier out 
settlements on June 15, 1751. The letters reflect the growing Carolinian presence in the region 
and lends credence to the Out and Lower Cherokee fears of an impending English invasion. Glen 
                                                        
20 Glen to Tacite of Hywasse, in DRIA I, 68. 
21 Glen to Tacite of Hywasse, in DRIA I, 67. 
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ordered his officers to patrol the border and prevent any Indians “to pass downwards to molest or 
disturb the Inhabitants of this Province and you are to be equally carefull that no white Person 
whatever either with or without Goods, be permitted to pass toward the Cherokee Nation.”22 The 
Cherokees nearest South Carolina viewed the patrols as a threat. The patrolling forces’ arrival 
triggered rumors that South Carolina intended to attack the Cherokee. The fear generated by the 
patrol forces’ arrival is the madness that Glen commends the Tacite of Hiawassee for not letting 
overtake his own people. The interpretation of the patrol forces true intent was regional in nature 
as the more removed regions found less credibility that an attack was imminent and the more 
southeasterly regions found an attack much more plausible. 
These orders undoubtedly upset the Cherokees of the regions close to South Carolina 
because the Middle and Out Cherokees of Joree, Tuckasegee, Tuckliha, Cowee, Watauga, and 
others sent Glen a letter of reconciliation for the incidents that took place and pleaded for the 
resumption of trade.23 Their efforts were an attempt to assuage the fears caused by the rumors. 
Glen, however, wanted the assurance of apprehending the perpetrators before allowing traders to 
venture deeper into other Cherokee regions. The correspondence with the Overhill Cherokees 
does not take the same reconciliatory approach, but does reflect the regional nature of Cherokee 
diplomacy.  
The letters Glen wrote to the Tacite of Hiwasee and the Cherokee Emperor reflect the 
Cherokee regional division. In both letters, Glen tells the respective recipient about the 
“Difficulty [of] sending Ammunition or Goods to your Towns from hence till such Times as we 
have obtained Satisfaction from the Lower Towns. W[e] therefore hope that as Friends and 
                                                        
22 Governor Glen to Captain Fairchild, June 15, 1751, and Governor Glen to Captain Gibson, 
June 15, 1751, in DRIA I, 169. 
23 Talk of the Cherokee Towns to Governor Glen, Joree, May 6, 1751, in DRIA I, 172-3. 
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Allies you’ll concur with us to remove those Difficulties that you may be sooner supplied with 
Everything you want.”24 This move by Governor Glen is very near blackmail. He recognizes that 
the Valley and Overhill towns did not participate in or condone the actions of the Lower and Out 
towns. His refusal to send traders to their regions showed his wish that they would pressure the 
Lower and Out towns to comply with his disciplinary measures. This seemingly minor event also 
showed how the actions of one region can have a profound effect on the other regions.  
Glen was not an absolute ruler of South Carolina and also had to contend with the 
colonial legislature on such matters as Indian affairs. At the behest of the South Carolina 
Commons House, the colony imposed a trade embargo against the Cherokee nation.25 The effects 
of the Out Towns’ plundering of trade goods did not remain within that particular region. Their 
actions reverberated throughout the entire Cherokee nation. In response, Governor Glen 
proclaimed to the colony’s traders, “by the Advice of his Majesty’s honorable Council, and in his 
Majesty’s Name and Authority, Order you and each of you forthwith to leave the Cherokee 
Nation with all your Effects as you will answer the Contrary at your Peril.”26 Glen’s orders 
affected the entire nation, and not just the regions where the actions took place. This event 
severely restricted the more remote Valley and Overhill towns to European trade goods. During 
times of war or the primary hunting season, these restrictions could be devastating and caused 
rivalries between the regions where the actions took place and the regions suffering the 
                                                        
24 Glen to the Cherokee Emperor, DRIA I, 174; a similar statement is made in Glen to Tacite of 
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25 Robinson, James Glen, 89. 
26 Governor Glen to the Traders of the Cherokee Nation, June, 15, 1751, in DRIA I, 66-7. 
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consequences despite their innocence. Without intending to do so, the colonial legislature’s 
decision exemplifies the Anglo-Cherokee relationship’s volatility.27 
By imposing a trade embargo, South Carolina was giving the politically dominant 
Overhill Cherokees a just cause to pursue the European trade elsewhere. Old Hop’s decision to 
send envoys to the French and Virginians is completely justified in the context of Cherokee 
regionalism. They were being punished for something they did not do, and their livelihoods were 
directly linked to the trade of deerskins. Governor Glen realized the possible negative outcomes 
from an embargo, but the factionalism within South Carolina was too strong to prevent it.28 The 
colonial attempt to reconcile the Cherokees to justice by surrendering the individuals accused of 
crimes, actually created an environment in which reconciliation would be more difficult to 
achieve. Now, the situation would require full-scale diplomatic engagement. 
In the more diplomatic setting of a council, the regional factionalism is apparent in the 
Cherokee’s speeches to Governor Glen. The council began on November 13, 1751, with a speech 
from Governor Glen to the Cherokee head men gathered in Charleston. The Cherokee made an 
initial response the following day, but resolved to review the day’s and previous day’s speeches 
and make a final response on the 15th of November. The make up of the delegation, as well as the 
                                                        
27 A key characteristic of Richard White’s middle ground is newly developed customs and 
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House because of his direct dealings with the Cherokee, see Richard White, The Middle 
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815, 2nd ed., (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xxvi-xxvii. The embargo also embodies Hatley’s 
findings that the frontier greatly influenced the center because the frontier rumor spurned 
the colonial legislature into action; see Hatley, The Dividing Paths, xiv-xv. 
28 This factionalism is part of the divide between Governor Glen and the colonial legislature that 
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differences in the days’ primary speakers and the language they used illuminates the Cherokee’s 
factionalism and how their regionalism played out politically. 
There were many Cherokees at this council with Governor Glen. Those who spoke 
included the Tacite, or Raven, of Hiwasee, Tacite of Stecoe, Conotatche of Tugaloo, Skiagunsta 
the Warrior of Keowee, Sachetche of Tuckasegee, and the Raven of Toxaway.29 The Raven of 
Hiwasee from the Valley Towns led the delegation, however, the rest of the speakers came from 
the Lower and Out Towns. This first suggests that the peace talks were regional in nature. There 
are no representatives from the Middle and Overhill regions present during these talks. Despite 
that, the Tacite of Euphasee, the Tacite of Ousteneca, Johney of Great Tellico, Captain Caesar of 
Chota, “and other head Men in the Name and Behalf of Ammouskossittee, their Emporer, send 
down to their Brother the Governor and beloved Men in Charles Town.”30 The fact that 
Governor Glen was not negotiating with the representatives of the ‘Cherokee Emperor,’ but 
rather representatives from the regions where the events took place shows that Cherokee regions 
operated independently. That does not mean that Cherokees from the Valley, Middle, and Out 
Towns did not have an influence on the proceedings, however.  
 Secondly, the council’s proceedings suggest that the Tacite of Hiwasee was acting as a 
diplomatic intermediary. He led the delegation’s opening remarks on both dates and the 
correspondence between he and Governor Glen includes multiple statements of their respect for 
one another.31 Having Tacite of Hiwasee present was mutually beneficial for the two parties 
because he, and others from the unoffending regions, could influence the other regions to 
                                                        
29 Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, In Council, November 14, 1751, and Talk of 
the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 15, 1751, in DRIA I, 175-178, 178-184. 
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extradite the criminals to the English. If successful, trade would return to their respective regions 
and Governor Glen would have his justice. The Tacite of Hiawasee was the primary Cherokee 
speaker on November 14, but the following day he would step aside.  
The Tacite of Hiawasee led the Cherokee delegation when meeting with Governor Glen 
in November of 1751. On November 15, the Tacite of Hiawasee only made a very brief 
statement and concluded with “I think we did not give you a full Answer last Night. But I live a 
great Way from the Towns where these things happened and from whence the bad Talks came. I 
therefore desire that the Warriour of Keowee may speak.”32 At this point, Skiagunsta, the 
Warrior of Keowee, becomes the primary speaker for the Cherokee. He explains why the trouble 
and “bad talks” occurred in length. This is radically different from his statements the previous 
day in which he merely acknowledged the governor’s talks and stated that he would tell them to 
his people. This turnaround is likely due to Cherokees from other regions prodding Skiagunsta to 
cooperate for the sake of the greater Cherokee nation.  
Skiagunsta’s explanation as to the causes of the troubling events is a reflection of one of 
the primary causes of regional factionalism. The Cherokee-Carolina borderlands were an 
incredibly diverse region full of enemies and allies. Along with their colonial neighbors, the 
Cherokee also had indigenous neighbors, some of whom allied with non-British colonial powers. 
The Cherokee enemy, the Creeks, bordered the Lower Towns and created a tension unparalleled 
in other Cherokee regions. Skiagunsta details that the killing of a white man was an accident 
caused by a Creek raid on the Cherokee people. Shortly after “Norward Indians” had recaptured 
Cherokee prisoners of the Creeks, a scout returned from a home with “Word that he heard People 
talk in the Creek Tounge and one Chickesaw Fellow, but that he heard no English Spoken,” and 
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“from which they considered that there was no white People there.” 33  After realizing that there 
were indeed whites in the home, the party did what they could to protect them from further harm, 
but a fatal blow was already dealt. This helps explain why that particular region acted the way it 
did; it was the geographic proximity to enemies that caused increased tensions and prompted 
individuals to act. Additionally, this elucidates another cause of regional factionalism. 
The bad talks emanating from the Lower and Out Towns resulted in the cessation of 
trading for the entirety of the Cherokee nation. Governor Glen sent letters to Cherokee head men 
in the Valley and Overhill towns to explain that trade would be difficult without the submission 
of the Lower Towns. Only a week later he ordered all traders within the Cherokee nation to leave 
with all of their goods and the colony’s embargo followed soon after. This induced a defensive 
attitude for innocent Cherokees because they had not committed the crimes. By removing the 
trade of the unoffending Cherokees, South Carolina created a situation where those Cherokees 
distanced themselves from the offending region. Innocent Cherokees from other regions 
distanced themselves from the offenders in attempts to maintain their access to trade. These 
Cherokees would have blamed the embargo, at least somewhat on the Cherokees who committed 
the crimes. Due to other region’s actions some of the Cherokees are stripped of their subsistence 
and since the few perpetrators were concentrated geographically, the division reinforces 
Cherokee regionalism. Thus, access to economic opportunity plays a major part in the 
development and entrenchment of Cherokee regional factionalism. 
Similar to the Cherokees’ regional factionalism, the British colonials were not a 
monolithically unified state. Anglo-America had many points of contention. As a whole, there 
were rivalries with the other colonial powers, France and Spain. There were the inter-colonial 
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rivalries between South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and to a lesser extent North Carolina, and 
lastly there were different ideological factions within South Carolina. This examination will 
focus on the latter two points in the context of Indian diplomacy.  
The same chain of events that illuminated Cherokee factionalism also reveals the 
factionalism of colonial South Carolina. During this period, South Carolina had a “near 
monopoly on the Cherokee trade,” and examining how the colony enforced this role sheds light 
on the rivalries between colonial allies.34 Further factionalism appears within the colony. This is 
evident in the differing responses to the ‘murder’ and the correspondence between Governor 
Glen and his subordinates in the borderlands and Cherokee nation.  
Beginning in the 1720s the colonial governor of South Carolina was royally appointed 
but by the 1750s, fissures began to crack between the governor and the colonial legislature. After 
his arrival in 1743, Glen quickly realized there was a problem with the colony’s distribution of 
power between the governor, Council, and Commons House. Glen found his limited oversight of 
the bureaucracy troublesome and was frequently at odds with the colonial legislature during his 
time in office.35 The response to the ‘murder’ of Daniel Murphy was one of those cracks. Glen’s 
removal of traders from the Cherokee country was not the stringent response the legislature 
hoped for. The Commons House instead instituted a formal embargo on the Cherokee. This 
decision is evidence of factionalism within South Carolina and it is also regional. The colonial 
legislature believed their decision better than the royally appointed governor because Glen was 
not a South Carolinian. This is despite Glen’s broader geo-political understanding that an 
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embargo would negatively affect the colony’s relationship with the Cherokee.36 The legislature’s 
embargo also had unforeseen outcomes that further expose colonial factionalisms. 
South Carolina claimed ownership over the Cherokee trade and the embargo aimed to 
stop all trade with the Cherokee. This goal was difficult to accomplish though. The governor 
quickly realized that a complete embargo needed to be enforced or illicit trading would seep into 
the Cherokee country. Glen’s June 15, 1751, letters to Captain Fairchild and Captain Gibson told 
them to disallow any Indian from entering the province and “to be equally carefull that no white 
Person… from whatever Province they may pretend to come… of going into the Cherokees.”37 
Fairchild and Gibson were rangers and the governor’s first line of defense as they patrolled the 
frontier borderlands.38 Glen’s understanding that a trade embargo would invite traders from rival 
colonies into the Cherokee nation to poach the trade markets evoked his orders. 
Glen’s fear of poaching Virginia traders materialized in late August. Captain Fairchilld 
wrote to warn Governor Glen of the impending breach. He explained that a trader, Richard 
Smith, was “assuring the Indians of a good cheap Trade from that Province [Virginia],” as South 
Carolina has “now grown troublesome.”39 Captain Fairchild’s concern constituted the entire 
subject of his letter to Governor Glen, the first one sent since the initial orders. Virginian 
encroachment was clearly a primary concern for Governor Glen and South Carolina. Old Hop’s 
overture to Virginia initially found strong support as “Colonel Lewis Burwell, president of the 
Virginia Council and acting governor, promised to encourage traders to the Cherokees and gave 
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them presents worth over £200 before their departure.”40 Glen protested this support and claimed 
the envoy was unauthorized and that they were guilty of crimes against South Carolina. 
Virginian officials acquiesced and published an article in the Virginia Gazette explaining the 
Cherokee delegation’s ‘deceit’. Glen’s action following the bad news illustrated the preeminence 
of this concern. 
Notwithstanding Virginia’s compliance with Glen, Captain Fairchild’s letter included 
some alarming intelligence on the situation in the Cherokee nation. Fairchild mentioned reports 
from the Lower Towns claiming “that the Indians of [Keowee] and [Oustenalley] are destroying 
their own Corn Fields by Way of fat’ning their Horses as if for some Journey.”41 The journey 
was to meet traders from Virginia and this was unacceptable for Glen. The governor’s reaction to 
the information showed that he now supported the legislature’s embargo and also how important 
the Cherokee trade was for South Carolina. The governor quickly sends a single letter to 
Captains Gibson, Fairchild, and Minnick so that the first one to receive it will be able to act 
immediately.  
Governor Glen’s letter first made the recipient aware of the situation and then continued 
with orders. He commands that the captain escort any traders and their goods to the Congarees. 
He additionally states that “these Traders are to be piloted into the Cherokees” by licensed 
traders and orders that “You are to compel these Persons to come along with you to the 
[Congarees], and are to send them to [Charleston], or to detain them there… being very carefull 
that neither of them gets to the Cherokees.”42  
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Governor Glen’s orders prominently make three points. First, that the Virginian trade was 
a detriment to South Carolina and fuels the rivalry between the two colonies. Governor Glen 
disagreed with Virginia’s approach towards Indian affairs and the Indian trade was as a 
prominent issue.43 Colonial factionalism was geopolitical, and amounts to a refined form of 
regionalism. English inter-colonial relations acted quite similarly to Cherokee inter-regional 
relations. Additionally, despite the differences between South Carolina and Virginia, they would 
work together on some levels because they were distinct entities united under the English Crown. 
This is comparable to the cooperation of Cherokee regions. Colonial cooperation, despite 
disputes, also compares to the inter-regional cooperation of the Cherokee. The Tacite of 
Hiawassee’s participation in the 1751 council as an Overhill Cherokee similarly showed an inter-
regional ability to work together when necessary. Inter-regional and inter-colonial relations had 
some procedural differences, but the goals of peace and renewed trade were nearly identical.  
 Second, the desire to make sure that neither licensed nor unlicensed traders reached the 
Cherokees illustrated that there would be some South Carolinian traders willing to skirt the 
legislature’s orders and continue trading illegally. There is clearly a point of factionalism 
between the Governor, South Carolina’s legislature, and subordinates in the field. The potential 
of unlawful trade with Virginia brings this to light. Richard Smith, Abraham Smith, and Joseph 
Oliver, are three traders mentioned in the captains’ and Glenn’s correspondence in regards to 
illegal trading. Both Richard Smith and Abraham Smith appear as licensed Cherokee traders on a 
recorded list of licensed traders, but Joseph Oliver only appears in the documentary record in 
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accordance to the aforementioned incident.44 The actions of the either illicit or opportunistic 
traders represented a challenge to the authority of the colonial legislature. These three saw no 
reason for South Carolina’s trade embargo with the Cherokee to inhibit all trade with the 
Cherokee.  
These three traders, if actually connected to the illegal trade, may have only been acting 
in their own best interests. After 1720, “the practice of taking Indian wives and fathering 
children of mixed blood,” proliferated and with this tactic, South Carolinian traders began 
“settling among the Indians, building houses, learning the language, and respecting the 
traditions.”45 This suggests that many of the traders relied on trading as their primary source of 
income and further suggests why some traders may not have enthusiastically left the Cherokee 
nation as ordered to by Governor Glen. For a trader with a Cherokee family, leaving the country 
generally meant leaving behind his family because of the matrilineality and matrilocality of 
Cherokee society. The Commons House’s embargo also undercut traders’ business. Richard 
Smith translated and recorded a message from nine Lower Cherokee headmen to Governor Glen 
in which they apologize for and explain the events that took place in their region. The Cherokees 
“heartily beg [Governor Glen] not stop the Trade… on Account of what has happened,” and 
“promise and assure [Glen], there shall never be any such ill Usage again.”46 This is as close as 
Richard Smith gets to the embargo issue. Smith here is probably more concerned with the 
continuation of trade than with South Carolina’s sense of justice. The cessation of trade very well 
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46 The Head Men and Warriors of the Lower Cherokees to Governor Glen, May 10, 1751, in 
DRIA I, 62. 
 30 
could have prompted Richard Smith to engage in illegal trading as a means of subsistence and 
this clearly showed the factionalism within the colony of South Carolina.47 
 Finally, Glen’s orders showed that the licensed traders who were assisting the illegal 
trade and making illegal promises to the Cherokees committed crimes against South Carolina. 
While the factionalism stemming from illegal trading does follow a regional pattern because of 
the locations of trade, it most closely reflects Cherokee society’s understanding of autonomy. 
Traders engaging the Cherokee illegally were acting autonomously. The colony forbid all trade, 
however, individuals who did not agree with the policy or found the opportunities too great to 
leave untapped refused to follow the colonial dictates. These actions were criminal in the eyes of 
South Carolina, however, the crimes still happened. This is similar to a Cherokee individual 
committing a transgression that was explicitly forbidden and agreed upon. The criminality of 
trade showed that individual Carolinians were willing to act against their governing body. It is in 
an environment like this that rumors such as Murphy’s ‘murder’ are able to grow towards crisis 
level. The factionalism of both societies created situations were so many threads needed to be 
counted, that some might inappropriately poke through the cloth of Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy. 
Factionalism in South Carolina was prevalent in their diplomacy with the Cherokee. Itself 
affected by an intra-colonial divide, the colony’s trade embargo with the Cherokee forced South 
Carolina to act against its colonial neighbors and impose restrictions on its own citizens. This 
factionalism, in essence a result of Cherokee factionalism, influenced how the events played out 
within South Carolinian society. The trade embargo and its enforcement prompted some South 
Carolinians to engage in illegal trading during this period. The disconnect showed factionalism 
                                                        
47 Traders and their Cherokee wives served as bridges to White’s middle ground. Their 
expulsion from the Cherokee country was a serious threat to the customs and practices 
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within South Carolina with a fissure between Governor Glen and the individual traders. In the 
mid-eighteenth century, factionalism on both sides of the dividing line created a particularly 
volatile Anglo-Cherokee frontier. 
The Cherokee nation and South Carolina in the mid-eighteenth century had drastically 
different cultures. Even with the readily apparent differences, the two societies operated in 
surprisingly similar ways. During the affairs concerning the supposed death of Daniel Murphy 
and the plundering of Bernard Hughs, these factions took center stage. The correspondence and 
speeches of the Cherokee headmen clearly delineated and demarcated the factions. The ways 
Cherokee headmen responded to the transgressions and “bad talks” followed regional lines. 
Geography, both physical and geopolitical, significantly influenced the formation of Cherokee 
factions. In order to understand the process of Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy also requires a clear 
understanding of how regional factionalism worked within Cherokee society. It is clear that 
Cherokee regional rivals each had their own seat at the diplomatic table. 
Colonial historians typically understand the Cherokee nation as a decentralized but 
unified people with certain levels of autonomy on the individual, town, and regional basis. The 
“murder” of Daniel Murphy clearly showed that Cherokee diplomacy and power was even more 
decentralized than generally acknowledged. Cherokee regions during this period frequently did 
not agree with each other. This forces the politics of Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy to incorporate 
this regional factionalism. As the November council of 1751 played out, regionalism pervades 
the diplomatic negotiations. Transgressions committed by individuals in two Cherokee regions 
caused the nationally significant diplomacy. The primary speakers during the discussions of the 
“bad talks” were Cherokees from the offending regions, while other regions remained generally 
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unaccounted for at the negotiations. This does not seem that unusual, however. The resumption 
of trade was a major concern for the Cherokees nationally and not just for the offending regions. 
Factionalism also pervaded Anglo-American society. South Carolina had Virginia and 
Georgia as their primary colonial rivalries. The enforcement of the Cherokee trade embargo 
reflected these rivalries and caused divisions between the English colonies. Within South 
Carolina, a factional divide existed between the governor and the minor borderland actors. Just 
as Cherokees’ had the autonomy to make their own decisions, traders also were able to choose to 
circumvent the Governor’s orders and trade despite an embargo, albeit, illegally. Anglo-
Cherokee diplomacy makes sense of this variability, and the “murder” of Daniel Murphy reveals 
this. 
In the early 1750s, this particular incident brought all of these factions into clear light. 
The ways in which Cherokee and colonial factions functioned were very similar. This 
factionalism resulted in misunderstandings, and the restructuring of relations. In an era of 
increasing geopolitical turmoil, understanding the factions within the opposing societies is a 
critical analytical focus. Doing so reveals a clearer picture of the era and a well-grounded 
understanding in the diplomatic process between the two peoples. This approach shows that the 
politics of place was incredibly important in determining the outcomes of Anglo-Cherokee 
diplomacy. 
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GATEWAY TO THE CHEROKEE NATION:  
KEOWEE AND THE CONSTRUCTION, UTILIZATION, AND SEIGE  
OF FORT PRINCE GEORGE 
 
In the eighteenth century, Keowee was a prominent Lower Cherokee town in present-day 
South Carolina. In 1753, the colony of South Carolina built Fort Prince George adjacent to the 
town, although around 1750, Keowee appeared to be in decline. Disease and warfare, often in 
tandem, devastated Keowee and other Cherokee towns throughout the eighteenth century. A 
1751 memorial from Robert Bunning and three other experienced Cherokee traders, recalled a 
time when “there were six thousand stout Men in [the Cherokee nation],” but “They are now not 
Half.”1 Despite the town’s history of episodic decline, by mid-century the construction of Fort 
Prince George would lead to the resurgence of Keowee as a regionally and nationally significant 
town in the Lower region. The fort also figured prominently in the region’s geopolitics during 
the period.  
The Cherokee Lower Towns were a dynamic region in the early and mid-eighteenth 
century. Tugaloo was the region’s mother town throughout most of the century. Thomas Hatley 
explains how mother, or beloved, town status enabled greater autonomy not bestowed to less 
influential towns.2 Hatley describes Keowee in the late 1750s as a mother town; however, Tyler 
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Boulware labels Tugaloo as the Lower Cherokee mother town during the Seven Years’ War.3 
Boulware’s analysis incorporates the fluidity of beloved town status and more accurately reflects 
the Cherokees’ understanding. Early in the eighteenth century, most of the Lower Towns were 
along the Savannah River with few towns within the Keowee River Basin.4 Between 1730 and 
1754, Keowee’s prominence grew and the region’s demographics reflected Keowee’s swelling 
influence. After the construction of Fort Prince George and the outbreak of war, there were three 
times as many towns within the Keowee River Basin as along the Savannah River.5 Keowee’s 
proximity to Fort Prince George, the security it offered, and the town’s heightened ability to 
influence diplomatic affairs appealed to the war-torn region. Additionally, the coinciding 
demographic shift further aided the growth of Keowee’s regional and national prominence within 
the Cherokee nation.  
Keowee was the Cherokee Trading Path’s terminus before South Carolina extended it to 
Chota with the completion of Fort Prince George. Keowee’s location on the trading path allowed 
the town to develop into an important Cherokee town in the mid-eighteenth century. The 
advantage of Keowee’s location was its access to resources, goods, people, and information 
going throughout the Cherokee nation and towards Charleston, flowed through the town. 
Keowee’s location on the path also influenced the decision to build a fort there. 
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South Carolina’s decision to build a fort near Keowee was not a simple resolution. The 
Cherokees prodded James Glen, the Royal Governor of South Carolina, to build a fort for years 
before South Carolina’s colonial legislature complied and built Fort Prince George. The Lower 
Cherokees sought the protection of a fort because the Cherokee-Creek War was flaring up in the 
first half of the 1750s. Glen needed to prove, and then convince the colonial legislature, that 
building a fort was economically feasible, as well as profitable. In 1753, with provincial backing 
and his personal financial support, Governor Glen at the head of sixty soldiers and fifty workers 
built Fort Prince George, ensuring Keowee’s ascendency to prominence.6  
Keowee’s rise to distinction throughout the 1750s and early 1760s is a story fraught with 
factionalism and the volatility of Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy. The story of the town’s rise is best 
told in three parts that each illustrate the factionalism, as well as the erratic nature of the 
Cherokee-South Carolina relationship throughout the period. The construction of Fort Prince 
George, Keowee’s early role in the Seven Years’ War, and the Cherokee’s political factionalism 
mixing with regional homogenization during the Anglo-Cherokee War distinctly show the role of 
factionalism in Cherokee and Anglo-American society, while helping to explain their seemingly 
unstable relationship during the era.  
Together, Keowee and Fort Prince George formed a major trade hub for the Cherokee 
nation and connected the inland Cherokees to Charleston, South Carolina, and the broader 
Atlantic World. The trade primarily occurred at established locations, and eventually, nearly 
exclusively at colonial forts. The Indian trade was a webbed network in which individual Indians 
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would gather deerskins and sell them to traders. The colonists funneled the skins towards 
Charleston and then on to England. By 1748, Charleston was processing approximately 160,000 
hides for export.7 Keowee was not a Cherokee mother town; however, it was still a prominent 
town during this period in the Lower region and greater Cherokee nation. 
The “’Murder’ of Daniel Murphy" illustrated the ability of a single fictitious event to 
create and reinforce regional identities and associations within Cherokee society. It was merely 
one of many events, however, that did so over the following two decades. One source of the ‘bad 
talks’ emanating from the Cherokee country in 1751 was a result of the reported murder of the 
trader Daniel Murphy in Oustenalley, a Lower town. The initial misinformation set off a 
firestorm of ‘bad talks’ in the region that were not always directly related to Murphy’s supposed 
murder. When a council in November of 1751 finally convened, the regional nature of Cherokee 
society was evident. The Tacite of Hiawassee acted as a diplomatic intermediary from the Valley 
Towns for representatives of other Cherokee regions. Skiagunsta, the Warrior of Keowee, was a 
Lower Town representative.8 The difference between Skiagunsta’s participation on the first and 
second days of the council demonstrates that he wished to position Keowee, and even the Lower 
Towns, within the Cherokee nation and in the greater colonial context with South Carolina. 
Skiagunsta’s participation showed that he desired to work with the other Cherokees and 
South Carolina. Given the Cherokee social system, he and every other delegate had every right to 
avoid the council. By attending and speaking, he displayed his desire to remain on relatively 
good terms with the unoffending Cherokees and the Carolinians. His speech on the first day was 
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terse and lacked substance as he merely acknowledged the Governor’s talks and stated that he 
would relay them to his townspeople.9 His initial speech first appears to be crude diplomacy, 
although it actually was a display of his regional identity and Keowee’s unhappiness with the 
present circumstances. On the second day of the council, Skiagunsta elaborated in detail how and 
why bad talks arose. The dramatic shift in Skiagunsta’s tone and context, additionally, reflected 
the inter-regionalism among the Cherokee. The occurring changes were far more likely to 
happen because of the presence of the Tacite of Hiawassee. His influence would have 
contributed to Skiagunsta’s decision. The Lower Towns desired to be included in the greater 
Cherokee nation. At this time, the resumption of trade for all the Cherokee people was a larger 
concern than the squabbles emanating from the Lower region. 
The month of negotiations resulted in a treaty between the Cherokee nation and the 
colony of South Carolina. The agreement contains numerous developments between the two 
parties. First, it erased all past transgressions. It also established a system of justice for crimes 
committed by Cherokees and by Carolinians that stated that neither nation as a whole is 
responsible for the actions of individuals. Additionally, the Cherokee and South Carolina re-
established their trading relations with the treaty. Next, it prohibited the Cherokees from 
supplying French-allied Indians, and required that Cherokees give no credit to future bad talks.10 
Most significantly, the treaty stated that once South Carolina began to build forts in the Cherokee 
country, Cherokees would aid in the construction.11 The discussions between the Cherokee 
headmen and Governor Glen are largely devoid of substance though. The only significant 
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provision established was that the Cherokees would aid in their construction. Meanwhile, how 
many forts South Carolina would build, where they would build them, and when they would 
build them, remained unanswered questions.  
 
Building the Fort 
Fort Prince George was the first of two South Carolinian forts built in the Cherokee 
nation. Despite the Cherokee Overhill region’s stronger and the Lower Towns’ more contentious 
relationships with South Carolina, the colony built the fort in the Lower Towns in 1753.12 The 
politics of Cherokee regionalism forced this odd decision. Remarkably, Fort Prince George was 
not an attempt to suppress the unruly Lower Towns, but a measure towards their protection, and 
thus their loyalty.  
The Cherokee Lower Town’s geographic vulnerability in 1752 and 1753 expedited the 
construction of a Carolinian fort. The sporadic Cherokee-Creek War, which began in 1715 and 
continued until the English brokered a peace in 1755, erupted at mid-century and devastated the 
Lower Towns. This vulnerability led to the hasty construction of Fort Prince George near 
Keowee. The spring of 1752 was a devastating season for the region because of incursions made 
by the Cherokee’s French-allied enemies. By April, the Lower region was nearly uninhabited. 
Every Lower town, except for Estatoe and Keowee, had disbanded and the residents fled to other 
regions.13 This was not an unusual practice and even Keowee had been disbanded and reformed 
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within the past decade.14 This mass exodus resulted from persistent attacks by the French-allied 
Creeks. By 1753, South Carolina began construction of a fort near Keowee to help defend the 
Lower Cherokee and maintain peace in the region. Since the Lower Towns were forced to 
disband, South Carolina realized that trade needed to continue in order to preserve Cherokee 
loyalty. At this moment, the Lower Towns were a vital bridge to the entire Cherokee nation. 
South Carolina was working against French interests and Governor Glen was feebly trying to 
minimize intertribal conflicts, which drained the Cherokees’ and Creeks’ abilities as English 
allies.15  
The Creek attacks illustrate how geography and regionalism strongly influenced the 
Cherokee politics surrounding the construction of Fort Prince George. In 1751, the Lower Towns 
were involved in bad talks that were troublesome for South Carolina, but the next year the region 
desperately sought the colony’s assistance. While other regions in the Cherokee nation remained 
generally unaffected by the Creek incursions, the Lower Towns took the full brunt of the 
offensive. The region’s proximity to the Creek Indians created two intertwined difficulties, the 
threat of lethal violence, and an insufficient supply of goods. The Lower Towns consequently 
had to use the ammunition they received from their towns’ traders for their own defense. This 
decision, however, prevented the Cherokees from using that same ammunition to commercially 
hunt deer and produce an income to pay off debts and purchase other necessities. Due to the 
circumstances, two principal headmen remaining in the Lower Towns requested gifts of ball and 
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powder. They also wanted South Carolina to seek peace with the Creeks.16 The two headmen’s 
primary concern was preventing their removal from the region, and not the decimation of the 
region’s towns without the aid. Their concern reflected the importance of their home region to 
their identity and illustrated the regionalization of Cherokee politics.  
The Lower Towns’ appeal to South Carolina illustrated how the Cherokee nation was not 
a unified political entity during the eighteenth century. The Lower Towns did not receive aid 
from any of the other Cherokee regions, not even from the geographically adjacent Middle 
Towns or from the Overhill Towns. This is because the affairs of a particular region are not 
necessarily the affairs of the whole nation and requesting aid from other regions could be 
burdensome. This is especially pertinent in this era as town economies, town health, trade, and 
war contributed to the breakdown of intra-regional trade. Hatley explains that these factors 
disrupted “the older round of village activities and crippled the effectiveness of the basic life 
support provided in the towns.”17 During the trying times of the early 1750s, locality took 
precedence.  
The Lower Cherokee war with the Creek Indians reveals that region was the primary 
influence on Cherokee’s identity. After the Creek had already killed thirty-three Lower 
Cherokees, Estatoe and Keowee still held out hope so that the Cherokee nation might maintain 
their presence in the region and preserve some level of continuity.18 The strength of Estatoe and 
Keowee’s regional identity weakens the stature of kinship as a nationally unifying institution 
because kinship did not bring the Cherokee nation into the Lower Towns’ affairs. Kinship may 
have guided Cherokees to accept refugee clan members of other regions into their homes and 
                                                        
16 Talk from Skiogusto Kehowe and the Good Warrior Estuttowe, in DRIA I, 247. 
17 Hatley, “The Three Lives of Keowee,” 244-247, quote on 244. 
18 Talk from Skiogusto Kehowe and the Good Warrior Estuttowe, 247. 
 41 
towns. The war also showed other region’s unwillingness to send aid to the Lower Towns before 
Lower Towns deemed disbandment essential.19 At this time of despair, the Lower Towns’ affairs 
were not the affairs of other regions until they geographically entered another region. Most of the 
region fled and those who stayed in the Lower Towns sought English assistance because they 
could not expect aid from other Cherokee regions. The remaining Lower Cherokees turned to 
South Carolina because they were geopolitical neighbors and the only viable source of aid. The 
Lower region’s location was not only important because of their close proximity to the Creek, 
but for South Carolina, the region represented a gateway to the rest of the Cherokee nation. 
South Carolina’s main concern was not the return of the disbanded Lower Towns to their 
original locations, but the possibility of French success with the Overhills. The English feared 
that without access to the Overhills by way of the Lower Towns, the entire Cherokee nation 
might have aligned with the French. However, the Cherokee’s insistence upon a fort at Keowee 
was not persuasive enough for South Carolina to follow through with the governor’s 1751 
promise. Despite the pleas from the Lower Towns, the colonial legislature could not justify the 
expense of constructing a fort.20 It would take a regional faction of South Carolina frontiersmen 
to finally push the colonial legislature towards construction. The colony’s Cherokee traders 
convinced the colonial council to act with their petition to build a fort at Keowee, arguing that it 
was immediately necessary to maintain Cherokee allegiance. In a letter to Governor Glen, a 
Lower Town trader, James Beamer, forwarded the sentiments of many Cherokee headmen in a 
soft reminder of his promise to build a fort in the region. Later, Beamer added that if the French 
did come, the English presence would be a great trouble for Glen unless his “Excellency setles 
                                                        
19 Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 46.  
20 Saturday AM, July 7, 1753, DRIA I, 456. 
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[a] Fort directly in those Lower Towns.”21 Governor Glen agreed with Beamer’s assertions and 
under his personal direction, supervised the completion of Fort Prince George in late 1753.22 The 
construction of Fort Prince George among the Lower Cherokees reflects the regional nature of 
Anglo-Cherokee relations. For South Carolina, Keowee was the gateway to the Cherokee nation.  
Fort Prince George’s construction in 1753 was a result of various elements of Cherokee 
regionalism and South Carolinian factionalism that also played a role in their relationship’s 
volatile nature. First, the colonial legislature’s embargo in response to the ‘murder’ of Daniel 
Murphy and the Creek devastation of the Lower Towns soured Anglo-Cherokee relations. 
During this time, the Overhill Cherokees explored alternate possibilities, but the Lower Towns’ 
only potential access to European trade goods was through South Carolina. The circumstances of 
war and a 1752 famine exacerbated the Lower Towns’ need for solid trade relations. This 
explained why the Lower Towns desperately sought to prove their loyalty to South Carolina. 
Their desire for a fort that would ensure the region direct access to trade goods and contribute to 
the return of a relatively peaceful existence with the Creeks was a reflection of the Lower Towns 
geopolitical dependency on South Carolina. 
Second, the establishment of peace between the Cherokee and Creek was a major issue 
entwined with South Carolina’s decision to build a Cherokee fort. The autonomous nature of 
Cherokee society made this peace difficult. The meeting of July 5 between Cherokee headmen of 
the Overhills and Lower Towns showed that while some towns made peace, this did not ensure a 
peace between both peoples. Skiagunsta reiterateed this when he stated “I have shaken Hands 
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with the Creeks, and like the Talk,” but, “we are but two Towns at Present in the Lower 
Cherokees.”23 Two days later, Skiagunsta addressed the Overhills’ previous hesitancy towards 
peace by saying that the boys from over the hills had “talked madly,” and that he was thankful 
they realized their folly.24 Skiagunsta’s words had an air of contempt towards the other 
Cherokees who had previously stalled on peace. The Lower Towns’ disbandment forced those 
who remained to swiftly settle for peace. Skiagunsta mentioned the South Carolinian promise to 
build a fort at Keowee and repeatedly reminded the governor of this.  
Keowee’s location on the Cherokee Trading Path was important because of the strong 
ties engendered between the Cherokee and Charleston along the trading path. Glen’s decision on 
the fort’s location was a political maneuver against the Overhill Cherokee by first building a fort 
in the more docile Lower Towns.25 Robinson asserts that the Lower Towns were more loyal. 
More accurately, however, it was the region’s dire need of the benefits of loyalty. Without 
English support the Lower Cherokee were vulnerable to Creek attacks. These circumstances 
allowed Glen the diplomatic opportunity to prevent the Overhills from turning to the French.  
Third, factionalism within South Carolina also influenced the fort’s construction. The 
South Carolina Assembly was not as quick to decide upon the matter. The Assembly had issues 
with the value of a fort and questioned the fort’s financial backing.26 Glen used reports from 
Carolinian traders in the Cherokee country as evidence for the fort’s necessity and the legislature 
eventually approved the fort. This colonial factionalism was relatively minor and South Carolina 
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easily overcame it. Had the legislature’s decision differed, the resulting situation would be 
unrecognizable. 
Finally, the layers of factionalism influencing Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy also contribute 
to its inherent volatility. Keowee and the Lower Cherokee initially benefited from the 
relationship’s murkiness. Their inability to find alternate sources of trade goods necessitated 
their loyalty to the English, which in turn rewarded the Lower Cherokee with a fort. Governor 
Glen’s decision on the Lower Town region as the fort’s future location was only feasible after 
the legislature’s decision to provide the fort with financial backing. Without the regionalism and 
factionalism, the Cherokee-South Carolina relationship would not have had the difficulties of 
agreeing to the rather simple terms they managed to reach. The Lower Towns’ trying times 
following the Creek attacks created an ideal situation for South Carolina to establish a fort in the 
area that profoundly dictated Keowee’s regional and national roles for the next decade.  
During this time, the French made inroads with the Overhill Cherokee, but not with the 
Lower Cherokee. Fort Prince George anchored the Lower Cherokee loyalty to the British 
because of the fort’s political, militaristic, and economic importance. The colonial government 
finally agreed to construct a fort at Keowee during the council held by Governor Glen in 
Charleston in the summer of 1753.  
Representatives from all of the Cherokee regions attended the council. South Carolina 
was particularly interested in Old Hop’s correspondence and guidance because he was unable to 
attend due to concerns with travel. Old Hop, of the Overhill town Chota, established the closest 
thing to a Cherokee national capital. During the council at Charleston in 1753, the Cherokee and 
Creek settled a peace agreement only after Old Hop had sent down his approval. The Cherokee’s 
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and Governor Glen’s speeches and actions during these negotiations reflect the Lower Towns’ 
secondary position of importance in the Anglo-Cherokee relationship.  
Fort Prince George offered the protection needed for other Lower Cherokee towns to 
return to the region and catapulted Keowee towards beloved town status. Keowee’s national 
prominence among the Cherokee also rose because it was now the most significant trading and 
distribution center. The town also grew into one of the primary meeting locations for Anglo-
American and Cherokee diplomats.  
 
Keowee’s Diplomatic Role in the War 
War erupted between the English, French, and their Indian allies in North America in 
1754 over disputes in the Ohio River Valley. By the war’s outbreak, Keowee and the Lower 
Towns had undergone significant changes. Fort Prince George and Keowee had become the 
epicenter of Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy after South Carolina’s construction of the fort in the fall 
of 1753. The fort ensured a safe haven for Cherokee headmen to interact with various colonial 
commanders, traders, and diplomats. When travel to Charleston was still necessary, Keowee was 
now a major stop on the path runners would use to deliver information in both directions 
between Chota and Charleston. Even though Keowee became a prominent location of Anglo-
Cherokee diplomacy in the Cherokee country, South Carolina’s primary diplomatic interest was 
Old Hop. Keowee thus remained in a secondary position in terms of importance behind Chota. 
Keowee and its constituents used their geographic location and the politics of place as a means of 
attaining regional goals and thereby contributing to the volatility of the Cherokee-South Carolina 
relationship.  
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For two years, Fort Prince George stood as the only fort within the Cherokee country and 
this afforded Keowee’s rise as a more significant town. By 1754, the Lower Towns “[were] daily 
more and more confirmed in their Minds of the Benefite that [Fort Prince George] will in Time 
be to them and their Successors.”27 Within two years of the fort’s construction, the Lower Towns 
returned from their dispersal and there were seven towns larger or equivalent in size to 
Keowee.28 Throughout this growth, Fort Prince George’s proximity allowed Keowee to maintain 
its prominence. The growing imperial conflict also brought the town increased trade 
opportunities because of the fort. 
In the summer of 1754, Virginia was trying to establish trade with the Overhill Cherokee. 
However, due to the imperial crisis at hand, they proceeded through Keowee. The war with 
France and the security of the fort brought new opportunities to Keowee. One of which was 
Virginians who sought trade. Due to various regional issues such as declining game, the debts of 
poor hunts, and war with neighboring Indians, the Lower Towns had depended on trade with 
South Carolina since 1742.29 Virginia wanted to open trade with the Overhills and frontier 
warfare with France funneled Virginian emissaries through Keowee to Chota. War between 
France and England eroded inter-colonial rivalries as they coalesced under the threat of a 
common enemy. Due to this, South Carolina was more concerned that the Cherokee received 
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adequate English supplies than by whom actually supplied the nation. Economically, Keowee 
and Fort Prince George also acted as the major distribution center of the Cherokee nation. 
Traders brought goods and provisions, like cattle, to Keowee to sell at the fort and distribute 
throughout the nation. In addition to traders bringing goods into the town, South Carolina also 
shipped goods, provisions, and men into Keowee 
The English used Fort Prince George at Keowee as the gateway to the Overhill Cherokee. 
Keowee was the staging ground for all South Carolinian operations in the Cherokee nation. This 
is evident in South Carolina’s Captain Raymond Demere’s correspondence during his prolonged 
stay at the fort. Demere was going to be the commander of South Carolina’s Overhill fort, but 
due to extenuating circumstances such as illness and the presence of the enemy, he stretched his 
time in Keowee. While he was at Fort Prince George though, he used the fort as a command 
center for the construction of the Overhill fort. The men who would build the fort in the Overhill 
region would initially stop at Keowee and then proceed further on as circumstances permitted.30 
The soldiers’ presence brought small-scale economic potential for residents of Keowee and also 
potential husbands for the town and region’s women. Keowee’s diplomatic importance also grew 
because of the fort’s location. 
The fort was a significant piece of diplomatic infrastructure. It brought Overhill 
Cherokees down from the mountains to meet with South Carolinians, and even brought figures 
as prominent as the governor to Keowee. This was important for Keowee because for all 
interactions that occurred there between South Carolina and the Overhills, the Lower Town 
headmen were able to easily represent their region because of the geographic proximity. Non-
Keowee headmen from the Lower Towns were able to meet with South Carolina representatives, 
                                                        
30 Captain Raymond Demere to Governor Lyttelton, August 1, 1756, in DRIA II, 156-157.  
 48 
like Captain Raymond Demere, at Fort Prince George within a days notice. Headmen also used 
the fort to request more supplies in times of need.31 The fort’s location gave Keowee and the 
Lower Towns these opportunities, which required inconveniently great levels of effort for other 
Cherokee regions.  
When the Overhill leader the Little Carpenter met with South Carolina, he often did so at 
Fort Prince George. While there, he would inquire about the progress in building an Overhill 
fort, obtain news, and make reports on the status of trade in his region. While Overhill leaders 
met South Carolinians at the fort, Lower Town headmen had the chance to accompany them, and 
even possibly affect their negotiations.32 During Demere’s extended stay in Keowee, the 
Overhills grew increasingly irritated with the failure to follow through with the promise of a fort. 
The Lower region was able to use this regional divide to their benefit. 
In 1753, the Overhill region was the preeminent Cherokee region in Anglo-Cherokee 
politics. This was because of the growing French presence of minor representatives and their 
Indian allies in the region. Gifts given to the Cherokee reflect this in that the Overhill Cherokee’s 
gift was twice the size of the Lower Cherokee’s.33 Despite the Lower Towns growing loyalty and 
the close interactions brought by the fort, the region never became the primary focus of South 
Carolina’s Cherokee diplomacy.  
The Overhill Cherokee controlled the negotiations between Governor Glen and the 
Cherokee nation at the Saluda Conference of 1755, but the issue of white settler encroachment 
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was a Lower Town concern.34 In 1747, Governor Glen bought the left bank of the Long Canes 
Creek from the Cherokee, establishing the waterway as the fixed frontier. However, authorized 
land surveys spanned the creek as early as 1751. John Oliphant explains that between the 1751 
surveys and 1756, there was an explosion of backcountry settlers that increasingly encroached on 
Cherokee lands.35 Cherokees at the conference protested this settlement claiming the Long Canes 
Creek as the line of the fixed frontier. Most likely, those who protested the white encroachment 
were Lower Town headmen and not Old Hop, the Cherokee delegation’s Overhill leader.  
Establishing a fixed frontier was a major issue for the Lower Cherokee and an 
examination of Glen’s purchase of the Long Canes settlements, and the Saluda Conference, 
explain why this Lower Town issue would become a major Anglo-Cherokee diplomatic issue by 
the end of the 1750s. Glen originally purchased the lands from only a few Lower Town 
headmen, who did not consult other Cherokees. Cherokees furious over the concession united 
politically under Old Hop because of the sale.36 The Cherokee and Governor Glen understood 
the terms of the exchange differently. The Cherokee probably thought the sale fixed the 
boundary line at the creek and the settlers near there as an opportunity to harmoniously grow into 
each other’s interests, while Glen thought little of it.37 The Cherokee would have also expected 
South Carolina’s obligation to renew the terms so long as they remained true. This occurs in the 
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seventeenth article of the Cherokees 1751 treaty with South Carolina that reaffirms the fixed 
frontier as the Long Canes Creek’s “dividing Waters.”38  
At the Saluda Conference Governor Glen failed to fulfill the obligation of renewal. 
Despite Cherokee claims at the conference that the Long Canes was the fixed frontier, Glen does 
not address the issue according to given accounts of the conference’s proceedings.39 Governor 
Glen and the Cherokee finalized the Treaty of Saluda on July 2, 1755, however, by February 
1756, James Beamer was relaying Lower Cherokee complaints of white encroachment to the 
governor.40 Perhaps Old Hop and Glen did not discuss the issue in depth because Old Hop 
thought the original sale illegal or because the Little Carpenter’s insistence that trade was the 
most important issue. Regardless, the Lower Town issue went unresolved. In March 1756, after 
South Carolina failed to deliver on Glen’s promises, the Cherokee offered four hundred warriors 
to Virginia in exchange for ammunition, gifts, and an Overhill fort.41 The Treaty of Broad River 
was a political triumph for the Little Carpenter, but also failed to address the encroachment issue. 
Colonial encroachment on Cherokee lands was a major concern for the Lower Towns. 
White settlements so close to the Cherokee nation created many problems. The increasing 
population density escalated the potential for violent interactions. Colonial hunters also seriously 
undercut male Cherokee’s subsistence through the deerskin trade. With fewer skins to trade for 
goods like ammunition, the Lower Cherokee suffered additional stresses with commitments to 
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war. Oliphant contends that the colonial encroachment was “the key to Cherokee restlessness in 
the 1750s,” but fails to place the Lower Town issue in the context of the Overhills domination of 
Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy.42 When viewed through the lens of Cherokee regionalism, the 
question of why the most important issue was able to ferment for nearly a decade becomes clear. 
The most influential Cherokee diplomats from the Overhill Towns did not share the same level 
of concern expressed by the Lower Towns. South Carolina’s failure to slow the western 
migration of settlers primarily contributed to discontent towards the colony in the Lower Towns. 
By 1756, South Carolina’s growing frustrations with the Overhills meant they needed to 
be especially observant of the Lower Towns in order to eliminate the possibility of losing the 
whole Cherokee nation to the French or Virginia. The Lower and Middle Towns also 
experienced a famine in this year and gave South Carolina the opportunity to practice panem et 
circenses diplomacy.43 The Cherokee admittedly aligned with whoever gave them the most gifts 
and the famine explains the large amounts of provisions given to Keowee between June and 
August of 1756.44 Keowee was not the sole recipient of goods on this report. Keowee received 
multiple supplies of rice, bread, and flour while Old Hop received a single supply of flour and 
the Little Carpenter and his company only received hatchets.45 The discrepancy in these gifts 
showed that South Carolina was maintaining their strong relations with the Lower Towns 
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through Keowee. At the same time, South Carolina and Virginia’s inability to provide adequate 
protection to the Overhills opened the region to French-allied Indian raids; during which, Creek, 
Shawnee, and French representatives reasoned that only France could provide the Cherokee 
security.46 South Carolina’s assistance, however, endeared the Lower Towns so much so that 
“They [said] that the Overhill Towns may do whatever they please but if they incline to turn to 
the French they will divide the Nation and be true to the English.”47 Here the Lower Towns are 
using their position as the middleman between the Overhills and Charleston to obtain desperately 
needed goods. The flourishing Keowee-South Carolina relationship was mutually beneficial to 
both parties and hinged on regionalism. Keowee and the Lower Towns were able to gain 
concessions from South Carolina because without their loyalty and assistance the colony was 
unable to reach the decisive Overhill region. This is an illustration of the politics of place and the 
importance of region within Cherokee society. 
In 1756 and 1757, the strength of the Lower Towns relationship with the English was at 
its zenith. The Cherokee nation fought French-allied Indians in the Virginia backcountry and the 
nation acted as a buffer zone for South Carolina early in the Seven Years’ War. The same period 
brought many changes for Keowee and the Lower Towns, and the Cherokee nation. The 
construction of Fort Loudon undermined Keowee’s preeminence as the diplomatic epicenter 
because the Overhill political leaders now had access to the English in their own region. The 
installation of William Henry Lyttelton as Governor of South Carolina brought a new personality 
to Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy. The Cherokee nation’s increased participation in the Seven 
Years’ War, and particularly the Forbes campaign, helped homogenize the nation as the different 
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regions increasingly grew together ideologically. The solidifying of the Lower Town-South 
Carolina relationship was mutually beneficial to both parties and it was sustainable, however, it 
would not last. 
 
The Forbes Campaign and Inter-Regional Homogenization, 1758-1763 
The Forbes Campaign of 1758 was the high-water mark of Anglo-Cherokee relations in 
the mid-eighteenth century. The Cherokee aided the English attack on Fort Duquesne near 
present-day Pittsburgh. The campaign, however, also created the circumstances in which the 
Cherokee abandoned the alliance and went to war with the English. The Cherokee’s inter-
regional homogenization against the English was not complete and the Cherokee nation split into 
a dominant war faction and a rapidly declining peace faction. This inter-regional factionalism 
exacerbated the relationship’s volatility with explosive results. South Carolina and the Cherokee 
nation went to war with each other in 1758 and the Anglo-Cherokee War raged on until 1761.48 
The Forbes Campaign was the beginning of the end of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance. 
While on the campaign, Cherokee warriors “found only frustration in Forbes’s stolid advance 
and insult in his commanding manner,” and this caused many of the Cherokees to depart early.49 
Additionally, the returning Cherokee warriors met hostilities from backcountry Virginians who 
accused the warriors of theft and subsequently murdered some of the Cherokees. Daniel Tortora 
explains the violent outbursts resulting from horse theft and miscommunication by both 
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Cherokees and colonials.50 There were at least thirty Cherokees killed during their return, but 
most historians consider this a low estimate or the number exclusive to the Lower Towns.51 
These clashes forced a wedge between the Cherokee and the English. Nativist Cherokees from 
the Overhill and Lower regions both sought revenge for their murdered relations. The Lower 
Towns also had the further burden of having their hunting grounds poached by backcountry 
South Carolinians beyond the Cherokee-established frontier line of Long Canes Creek.52 These 
colonial misgivings alienated the Lower Towns so badly that they turned away from the English. 
The transgressions lost South Carolina the Lower Towns’ and most of the nation’s allegiance. 
The additional burden faced by the Lower Towns was able to push the region most loyal to the 
English astray. Only two years earlier, the Lower Towns were vocally willing to divide the 
nation if the Overhills joined with the French.53 After the Forbes Campaign, the Cherokee nation 
initially split into accomodationist and nativist factions that crossed regional lines. This 
homogenization occurred convergently in the various regions. 
In the preceding year, 1757, Cherokee warriors fulfilled their obligations by going to war 
for Virginia and the English. Overhill diplomats made the obligation, but the Lower Towns 
fulfilled it. The Cherokees sent approximately seven or eight bands of warriors, only one of 
which was from the Overhill region. Lower Town warriors constituted most of the Cherokee 
contingent.54 Virginia and Governor Dinwiddie made a crucial mistake in receiving the Cherokee 
warriors. Bedford Court House on the Overhill path received most of the presents and gifts 
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prepared by Virginia for the warriors. This mistake reveals how Cherokee regionalism continued 
influencing Anglo-Cherokee relations. 
The Cherokee nation was already weary of their English allies and only the Lower Towns 
contributed significant support. Virginia was, unaware of where the Cherokees were coming 
from, knew the Cherokees came from the Lower Towns and mistakenly sent the goods towards 
the Overhills, or, oblivious to the fact that sending the goods towards the Overhills would offend 
and insult the Lower Town warriors. In any event, Virginia offended the warriors. Wawatchee, 
the Lower Town headman leading the war party, permitted the warriors to take what they needed 
after finding no gifts and an absent guide at the arranged meeting location.55 The Lower 
Cherokee’s actions disenchanted the backcountry settlers’ sentiments. The warriors did not 
immediately leave the area, but actually engaged French forces once they left. The actions of 
insulted Lower Cherokee warriors in 1757 precipitously estranged the Cherokees from the 
English. 
In 1758, English Brigadier-General John Forbes was organizing an expedition against 
France’s Fort Duquesne in the Ohio country. The Cherokees supplied nearly four hundred 
warriors towards the English call to muster five hundred warriors from the southern Indians.56 
Corkran attributes the repeated English failures to enlist more Cherokees for war on “the 
ominous note of Cherokee-Virginia hostility.”57 Thus, Cherokee regionalism affected the 
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Cherokees’ earliest participation in the campaign because of the Lower warriors’ actions the 
previous year. 
Similarly to the events of 1757, the Cherokee in Virginia for the Forbes Campaign did 
not receive the expected presents for their service. The news that Forbes was not ready for war 
additionally disturbed the Cherokees gathering at Winchester, Virgina.58 These factors led most 
of the frustrated Cherokee warriors to desert the expedition and return home. The returning 
Cherokees clashed with backcountry settlers in Virginia throughout the summer, deteriorating 
the Anglo-Cherokee relationship.59 The previous summer’s hostilities exacerbated the colonial 
settlers’ fear of Indians, while the Cherokee’s colonial dissatisfactions preempted their search for 
goods. Both factors grew from Cherokee regionalism and led to further changes brought on with 
war.60 
The Anglo-Cherokee War was defined by the Cherokee sieges at Fort Prince George and 
Fort Loudon. In the spring of 1760, Cherokees attacked the forts they once pleaded the English 
to build. The siege at Fort Prince George was the first significant military engagement of the war 
outside of frontier clashes. The maturation process of initiating the siege at the Lower Town fort 
reveals the factionalism of the Cherokee nation in three particular ways.  
First, the Cherokee’s political factionalism was changing from regional factionalism to 
ideological factionalism. This was a transitional period for Cherokee diplomacy as both the 
fading regional factions and new ideological factions appear in their diplomacy. The two new 
factions were the peace-leaning accommodationists and the war-leaning nativists. While 
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Cherokee regionalism persisted, this new form of politics transcended the individual regions. All 
of the Cherokee regions internally divided into peace and war factions. Due to this, Cherokee 
politics underwent nationalization, as cooperation among the peace and war factions extended 
throughout the Cherokee nation, rather than intra-regionally. The year leading up to the siege 
illustrated how and why these changes came to the Cherokee nation. 
Following a series of 1759 retaliatory raids on the colonial backcountry in response to the 
Forbes Campaign, some Cherokees still sought peace with South Carolina. Interestingly, 
individuals from both the Overhills and the Lower Towns still believed in peace, but they still 
maintained regional divides in their negotiations. In mid May, Tiftoe of Keowee, a prominent 
headman of the town, proclaimed “All these [Lower] Towns and the Middle Settlements are 
according to our Promise still, and have good Thoughts, as we desire to live in Friendship with 
the white People.” He continues, “As for the Mischief that has been done, it was alone the 
outside Town over the Hills, Setticoe.”61 It is highly unlikely that no Lower or Middle Town 
warriors participated in the raids of 1759. Two days before Tiftoe gave the talk of Keowee to 
Lyttelton, Wawhatchee gave the talk of the Lower Towns to the governor.62 He also placed 
blame on the Overhill town, Setticoe, and described their actions as drunken mischief, and hopes 
that they are now sober. Most tellingly, he admits that although “there are some Rogues among 
us, our Thoughts are good.”63 The raids were retaliation for murdered Cherokee warriors 
returning from the Forbes Campaign and the Lower and Middle Towns suffered casualties. The 
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fact that Cherokee blood law gave the “brother or nearest male relative,” not the opportunity, but 
the “responsibility for avenging the death,” dismisses the possibility that no Lower or Middle 
Town warriors participated.64 There was a particularly notable raid committed by Setticoe 
warriors, but it was not the only raid.65 Tiftoe used the sensation of that particular raid in an 
attempt to protect his region’s warriors and maintain peaceful relations with his region. 
However, the headmen’s attempts were futile because the accomodationists’ influence in the 
Lower Towns had declined significantly by September 1758.66 By conflating all of the raids with 
a single Overhill raid, Tiftoe was able to maintain the façade of Lower and Middle Town 
innocence.  
Here Tiftoe’s effort represents the earliest period of transitioning to ideological, rather 
than regional, factionalism dominating Cherokee politics. Keowee’s location in the Lower 
Towns that were more inclined to South Carolina than Virginia, probably slowed Tiftoe’s 
transition out of regional politics. Tiftoe was most likely lying in an attempt to protect his region, 
even those among the war faction whom supported retaliation for the Forbes Campaign fiasco. 
According to John Phillip Reid, retaliation to earlier offenses was the foremost cause of war for 
the Cherokee nation and its people.67 Tiftoe’s attempt to conceal his region’s involvement 
showed that he feared South Carolina’s response to the war faction’s actions and that he was 
desperately trying to hold on to the regionalism of the previous decade. South Carolina’s threat 
of a trade embargo pacified the Lower Towns and the Little Carpenter’s diplomacy kept the 
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Cherokee nation out of war for the time. Despite Tiftoe’s and other Cherokees’ attempts to 
maintain peace, Lyttelton was tired of the Cherokee’s frontier misgivings. 
Governor Lyttelton made the decision for South Carolina to go to war with the Cherokee 
nation. War with the Cherokees was a divisive issue in South Carolina, primarily because of a 
war’s financial requirements. The war was justifiable, but some South Carolinians were 
unwilling to commit. Hatley examines the Governor’s decision but does not draw a comparison 
to the Cherokee’s wartime decision-making process. He writes, “As Lyttelton began to take 
matters into his own hands, his condescension became outright indifference to the sentiments of 
the Assembly,” but “More and more, however, the popular climate seemed to offer Lyttelton 
encouragement.”68 Similarly to the Cherokee, South Carolina was not unanimously ready for 
war. The colonial legislature hesitated because of the huge costs associated with military 
expeditions. However, Lyttelton received “encouragement,” from backcountry South Carolinians 
who were the targets of some of the Cherokee raids. The cost for survival was not too expensive 
for those threatened. Many men along South Carolina’s frontier eventually joined the militias 
raised to advance on the Cherokee.69 This is an expression of the politics of place in South 
Carolina. Lyttelton was able to use the legitimate calls for war from the backcountry to his own 
end, despite the eastern-based provincial Council’s hesitations to support the expensive 
endeavor, the desperate backcountry settlers rose to the occasion. As South Carolina prepared for 
war and Lyttelton’s seizure of control set the stage for his greatest folly, the Cherokee made 
another attempt at peace. 
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Two weeks after Lyttelton chose war, a Cherokee delegation arrived in Charleston to 
apologize for their hostile actions. The Governor arrested three of the Cherokee headmen and 
then decided that “a show of force would bring the Cherokees to their senses, he carried his 
hostages up-country to Fort Prince George at the head of thirteen hundred provincial soldiers.”70 
Due to Lyttelton taking control of the situation away from the colonial legislature, he was able to 
unilaterally make South Carolina’s diplomatic decisions towards the Cherokee. He also naïvely 
anticipated the return of normal relations upon his arrival and “brought a great gift, including 
three tons of gunpowder,” to distribute once the Cherokee turned in those responsible for the 
violence.71 Lyttelton imprisoned the Cherokee delegation in Fort Prince George and demanded 
that the Cherokee surrender a murderer for the release of each of his captives. Lyttelton only 
apprehended two Cherokees before returning to Charleston and ordered the fort’s commander to 
continue holding the prisoners and only distribute the gifts after he received the murderers. 
As the Governor held the Cherokee hostages at Fort Prince George, Keowee and the 
Lower Towns became the epicenter of Anglo-Cherokee relations. Major Cherokee headmen 
from every region came to Keowee to speak with the English at Fort Prince George during this 
moment of crisis. The Cherokee’s primary concerns were to free their prisoners and the return of 
trade, particularly ammunition. 
Second, this period also witnesses the Cherokee’s growth towards political unanimity on 
the issue of war with the colonies. The peace faction’s mishandling of major diplomatic issues 
clears the way for the war faction’s rise to political dominance. During Lyttelton’s political 
spectacle, the accomodationists’ repeated failures opened the door for the rise of the war faction. 
                                                        
70 Hatley, The Dividing Paths, 114; quote, Anderson, Crucible of War, 460. 
71 Anderson, Crucible of War, 460. 
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Some prominent accomodationist Cherokee headmen agreed to cooperate with Lyttelton and 
they suffered for it politically. The headmen had no moves to make. Since the Cherokees who 
retaliated acted within their socially proscribed norms of violence, they would have to give their 
selves up voluntarily. Even with the accomodationist headmen’s support, Lyttelton was unable to 
settle the situation. The peace leaning headmen’s influence over Cherokee affairs diminished 
because they did not resolve the crisis and the Cherokees remained without ammunition for 
hunting and protection. 
Before the siege, Cherokees attempted to free their prisoners diplomatically. On February 
14, 1760, the Little Carpenter, Aganstata, and the Little Raven, Overhill headmen from Chota, 
attempted again. The commander, Alexander Miln “gave the same Anser… as [he] did to all the 
others who came on the same Errand…, that I [was] here under the Governor, and could not act 
contrary to my orders.”72 The commander refused to give up to hostages without apprehending 
the criminals. The innocent headmen would remain in custody as prisoners until the Cherokees 
quenched Lyttelton’s thirst for justice. This was the Cherokees final attempt at a peaceful 
resolution.  
With the accomodationist Cherokee’s options exhausted, the nativist faction rose to the 
diplomatic forefront. Two days later, the Cherokee attempted to free the prisoners by force. At 
this moment, the nativist war faction becomes the politically dominant Cherokee faction. On 
February 16, two Keowee women approached the fort and a Mr. Ducharty met them near the 
river. Aganstata, from the Overhill town Chota, arrived at this moment and requested Lieutenant 
Coytmore’s presence, upon which Coytmore joined the impromptu meeting. Aganstata gave a 
signal and he and the two women fled as Cherokees concealed on the banks of the river fired on 
                                                        
72 Alexr. Miln to Governor Lyttelton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA II, 497-501, quote on 498. 
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Coytmore and Ducharty, fatally wounding the lieutenant.73 The Cherokee then began firing on 
the fort as the hostages attacked the garrison with concealed knives and tomahawks from 
within.74 The hostages’ ill-fated actions led to their massacre. In terms of regionalism, the attack 
in the Lower Towns is important but it is not the only significant aspect. 
The massacre of the captive headmen sealed the fate of the Cherokee nation. War was 
now the only option. Earlier, Cherokees from Keowee like Tiftoe and Wawhatchee attempted to 
maintain the diplomatic benefits of their political regionalism. The inability to free the captives 
was an embarrassment for the peace faction and the massacre dissolved any legitimacy still 
associated with the accomodationists. The politics of the Cherokee nation was in a transitional 
phase from regional factions to ideological factions.  
Finally, the siege at Fort Prince George illustrated the totality of the war faction’s 
homogenization of the Cherokee nation. Keowee’s active role in the engagement reflected the 
success of the war faction’s political ascendency. Into 1759, the Lower Towns were the most 
devoutly loyal region towards the English. The beginning of hostilities in 1758, melted this 
strong relationship quickly and the Lower Cherokee eventually re-take the spotlight in Anglo-
Cherokee politics away from the Overhills, if only for a relatively brief period. The massacre at 
Fort Prince George destroyed any possibility for South Carolina to maintain diplomatic relations 
with accomodationist Cherokees. The fort’s proximity to the Lower Towns had buttressed their 
loyalty for nearly six years. The fort was previously a high point of the Cherokee-South Carolina 
relationship, but the massacre within its walls propelled the Lower Towns towards the nativist 
faction. The hostilities stemming from the Forbes Campaign and the failure of the 
                                                        
73 Alexr. Miln to Governor Lyttelton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA II, 497-501, particularly 499. 
74 Alexr. Miln to Governor Lyttelton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA II, 497-501, particularly 499-
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accomodationists to reconcile better trade terms with the English pushed the whole of the 
Cherokee nation towards war, but it took the massacre to lead the most ardent accomodationists 
to war. The war faction’s takeover of the Cherokee nation was complete as the once devoutly 
loyal Lower Towns guided the nation into the conflict. 
The siege of Fort Prince George was the major engagement of the war and its location in 
the Lower Towns was significant. First, it showed that the Lower Towns found the English 
irreconcilable. The English failure to accept any peace overtures ruined any chance of 
accomodationist ideology guiding Cherokee politics. The regional politics of the Cherokee 
nation during the previous decade receded as the war faction began uniting the nation against the 
English. Second, the leadership of Aganstata, an Overhill headman, exemplified the 
homogenization of the Cherokee regions. The initial decision to free the prisoners by whatever 
means necessary originated with Lower, Middle, Out, and Valley warriors, and Overhill warriors 
quickly joined the others.75 The participation of warriors from every Cherokee region, and 
Aganstata’s leading role in opening the siege, reflected the nationalization of Cherokee politics. 
The participation of Lower Town Cherokees also illustrated the advances the war faction made 
in the region, as well as the frustration of the accomodationists’ repeated failures.76 
Once the siege of Fort Prince George began, Cherokee warriors also started raiding 
English settlements. The Cherokee raiding parties killed or captured over one hundred Anglo-
Americans.77 The violence prompted a dramatic response from South Carolina. Colonel 
Archibald Montgomery, thirteen hundred regulars, and other auxiliary forces entered the Lower 
                                                        
75 Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 92. 
76 This is an example of a major change coming from the single social margin of the frontier 
described by Hately, see Hatley, The Dividing Paths, specifically, 105-129. 
77 Anderson, Crucible of War, 461. 
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Towns in June 1760, and proceeded to burn five towns, including Keowee.78 The surviving 
Lower Cherokees fled to the adjacent Middle region. The Cherokee repelled Montgomery’s 
advance into the Middle Towns. In 1761, James Grant replaced Montgomery and invaded the 
Middle Towns again. This time, the Cherokee defense “exhausted most of their ammunition,” 
and then “the warriors could only pick off unwary sentries and watch helplessly from the woods” 
as Grant razed the Middle Towns.79 That autumn the Cherokee sued for peace as the Anglo-
Cherokee War devastated their population and destroyed the Lower and Middle Towns.80 
The Anglo-Cherokee War tightly bound the Cherokee regions together. Initially, the 
nation divided over the issue of war, but the massacre at Fort Prince George quelled the 
influence of the peace faction. Across regional lines, the war significantly homogenized 
Cherokee attitudes towards their former allies. The English colonies experienced this same 
homogenization at the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. South Carolina was initially disturbed 
by Cherokee preludes with Virginia, however, the war brought South Carolina and Virginia 
together against the French. Cherokee explorations of Virginian trade became less troublesome 
for South Carolina in the shadow of a common enemy.  
                                                        
78 Anderson, Crucible of War, 461; Hatley, The Dividing Paths, 130, the other towns were 
Estatoe, Toxaway, Qualatchee, and Conasatche. 
79 Anderson, Crucible of War, 466. 
80 The total war tactics of Grant and Montgomery were a reflection of Euro-American’s 
interactions with Native Americans. John Grenier states that “the British Army came to 
terms with Americans’ first way of war in the Seven Years’ War and the Indian Wars of the 
early 1760s,” see John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), quote on 117; Grant and Montgomery’s 
tactics also reflect Wayne Lee’s findings that Euro-Americans found certain warfare more 
suitable for certain opponents, see Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary 
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Florida, 2001), 117-129, 99, 199. 
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The Cherokee’s situation during the Anglo-Cherokee War was particularly effective on 
their inter-regional unification because the war put the Cherokee nation on a diplomatic island. 
War with South Carolina ended the Cherokee’s longest lasting Euro-American trade relationship. 
To support the war effort the Cherokee needed access to goods. The Creek and other Indians of 
the Ohio Country were unwilling to aid the Cherokee and the French at Fort Toulouse had no 
goods to spare.81 The Cherokee’s inaccessibility to alternative trade sources explains the success 
of the war faction’s homogenization of the nation. 
By 1762, the end of the Seven Years’ War was within sight. With the Treaty of Paris of 
1763, France ceded all North American possessions to England, which eliminated one of the 
only bargaining chips the Cherokee held. As England became the only European power with the 
ability to supply the Cherokee nation, peace was more suitable than war. The 1762, “Act to 
Regulate the Cherokee Trade,” was beneficial for Keowee because it stated “that Fort Prince 
George at Keowee, shall be and is hereby appointed the only Place, from whence to carry on the 
Cherokee Indian Trade.”82 
For the Lower Cherokee town of Keowee, the long decade between 1751 and 1762 was 
tumultuous. The regional factionalism of the Cherokee nation’s politics entrenched the town. 
Throughout most of the 1750s, regional factionalism dominated Cherokee politics. The influence 
of regionalism was far reaching. It affected Cherokee relations with the Creek, colonial trade 
relations, and determined the location of English forts. Keowee and the Lower Towns used their 
regional identities to maximize potential benefits and minimize negative outcomes. As 
ideological factions came to dominate the Cherokee nation’s politics, subordinated regionalism 
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persisted. The Cherokee nation did not unify politically in this era. During the Anglo-Cherokee 
War, the war faction’s national influence briefly appears to unite the Cherokee nation. The war 
faction’s unification was national, but not absolute. Some Cherokees maintained their 
accomodationist approach through the conflict. The factionalism of this era was present in the 
Cherokee-South Carolina diplomatic relationship. This resulted in an era of Anglo-Cherokee 
volatility because the complex nature of Cherokee factionalism required South Carolina to 
engage with each faction diplomatically. Additionally, factionalism within South Carolina, while 
less influential, also contributed to the unstable relationship. The Cherokee nation’s 
decentralized diplomatic relations with Anglo-Americans in the mid-eighteenth century was 
notably more so than current understandings admit. Using Keowee as a lens for Cherokee 
diplomacy, reveals regionalism’s significance and adds a further layer of complexity to Anglo-
Cherokee relations in the mid-eighteenth century.  
 
 67 
THE CHEROKEE CAPITAL CITY: 
REGIONALISM IN CHOTA DURING PEACE AND WAR 
 
 The Cherokee political system of the mid-eighteenth century did not have a rigidly 
defined political leader or capital. Their decentralized system did not prevent South Carolina, 
and more broadly, the English, from establishing what amounted to a political leader. In the mid-
eighteenth century, South Carolina viewed Old Hop of Chota as the Cherokee “Emperor.”1 Old 
Hop undeniably held significant influence on the Overhill Cherokees and the greater Cherokee 
nation; however, his influence was not in line with the Euro-American conceptions of political 
power. Due to his close relationship with South Carolina and his political influence, Old Hop 
was regarded as the leader of the Cherokee nation.2 Even though Anglo-Americans viewed Old 
Hop and Chota as the Cherokee emperor and capital, their diplomacy was not as simple as the 
meeting of two dignitaries. They both used the politics of place as a diplomatic tool during that 
era.  
 Throughout the 1750s and 1760s, Chota and the Cherokee Overhill region used their 
regionalism diplomatically. Similarly to Keowee during the same period, Chota asserted 
Cherokee regionalism. The Overhill Cherokee used their regional autonomy to engage in 
diplomacy when it was regionally, and sometimes nationally, advantageous or necessary. In the 
1750s, the geographic barrier of the Appalachian Mountains offered Chota and the Overhill 
                                                        
1 Samuel Cole Williams, LL.D., ed., Lieut. Henry Timberlake’s Memoirs, 1756–1765: With 
Annotation, Introduction and Index, 1927, reprint, (Marietta, GA: Continental Book Company, 
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2 The distinction between influence and power is greatly significant here. Power, implies the 
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Cherokee greater geopolitical autonomy from South Carolina than other Cherokee regions. The 
town’s distance from South Carolina meant it had easier access to other Anglo and Euro-
Americans. This diplomatic freedom allowed Chota to develop into the Cherokee’s cosmopolitan 
capital city.3  
However, during this period, Cherokee diplomacy underwent changes. The Anglo-
Cherokee War’s inter-regional cooperation seen in Keowee also occurred in Chota. Due to the 
war, the regional specificity of Cherokee diplomacy nationalized as all Cherokee regions split 
into accomodationist and nativist factions. Throughout the era of inter-regional homogenization, 
Chota maintained its regional identity as its diplomatic importance receded. Before the outbreak 
of war, Chota’s regional identity contributed to the instability that eventually led to the conflict. 
Outside the tight diplomatic clutch of South Carolina, Chota frequently received French, 
Virginian, and various Indian visitors. 
Overhill regionalism contributed to the Cherokee’s participation in the conflicts of the 
era, which in turn also influenced Cherokee regionalism nationally. The same decline in 
regionalism’s prominence seen in Keowee also occurred in Chota. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, kinship’s influence on decision-making regarding war diminished. Theda Perdue asserts 
that by mid-century, the “intensity, scale, and duration of warfare increased dramatically” and 
that when the Cherokee fought for the English “they expanded the scale of warfare far beyond 
what had been customary.”4 Perdue’s examination of Cherokee warfare wisely observes its 
growth during the era, its effect on gender roles, and its effect on kinship as an internal political 
                                                        
3 The term capital city is applied loosely here. Chota was not a capital city in the Euro-American 
sense, but was the most influential Cherokee city as well as a major diplomatic center.  
4 Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700–1835, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 87, 89. 
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system.5 Her failure to recognize the strength of Cherokee’s regional identities consequently 
misses one of Cherokee warfare’s biggest developments during the 1750s and 1760s. During this 
period, Cherokee warfare became national. Previously, small bands of individuals or regions 
engaged in war, but the French and Indian War and Anglo-Cherokee War forced war to become 
a national initiative. The declining influence of the Cherokee’s regional identity in both Keowee 
and Chota reflects this change. As contemporaries still considered Chota a Cherokee capital, its 
influence on national affairs significantly increased during this period.  
  Chota did not always have the English distinction as the Cherokee capital. Intermittent 
habitation of the area began as late as 3,000 years ago, but Chota was not founded until the 
1730s.6 Originally, Chota might have been a hamlet of the town of Tanasi. The power and 
importance of Chota grew rapidly over the next two decades. By 1750, the town surpassed Great 
Tellico as the most powerful Cherokee town in large part to the triumvirate of Old Hop, Little 
Carpenter, and the Great Warrior.7 Chota’s three powerful leaders were the Cherokee nation’s 
most important diplomats of the era, and by 1756, they secured the construction of an Overhill 
fort from South Carolina. 
 In 1757, South Carolina built Fort Loudon along the Tennessee River near Chota. The 
fort played a major role in the Overhill Cherokee’s relationship with South Carolina. Its promise, 
construction, and presence were prevalent topics in the era’s diplomatic negotiations and 
correspondence. For the English, it helped diminish the threat of a Cherokee-French alliance. As 
a nexus of trade goods and correspondence, it helped prevent the Overhills from seeking 
                                                        
5 See Chapter Four, “War,” in Perdue, Cherokee Women, 86-108. 
6 Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native 
American Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 185. 
7 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 185-6. 
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alternative trade sources. The fort’s remote location was also a liability for the English and it was 
the site of a major battle during the Anglo-Cherokee War in 1760. Ironically, the nearest Overhill 
town, Chota, was known as a refuge of peace.  
 Another major component of Chota’s importance was its designation as a town of peace. 
Not only was Chota the Overhill beloved town, it was the Cherokee nation’s only town of 
refuge.8 Chota’s diplomatic importance magnified the significance of the town’s status as a white 
city of peace. Foreign emissaries that came to Chota spoke their messages freely. If Cherokee 
headmen, or the English, disagreed with or disapproved of emissaries’ messages, they could not 
silence their talks.9 Non-Cherokee Indians who had raided English-allied Indians would not be 
extradited to the English in Chota. Allowing foreigners a platform or refuge in Chota, and lesser 
Overhill towns, was a significant issue in the 1750s for the Cherokee and English. 
 Chota’s intramontane location was one of the town’s most vital assets. Between 1750 and 
1760, the town’s remote location offered opportunities, which also contributed to the instability 
of Anglo-Cherokee relations during this period. Chota’s white-city status brought many 
foreigners with diplomatic talks into the town.10 The headmen of Chota also often sent Cherokee 
diplomats to foreign peoples because of their diplomatic distinction. The Overhills’ frequent 
contact with other Indian peoples, Virginia, and French emissaries was troublesome for South 
Carolina, the Cherokee’s primary trading partner. 
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 South Carolina’s lengthy and considerable involvement with the Cherokee was vitally 
important for both the colony and English interests in the 1750s. French incursions from the 
North and West were a substantial threat to English interests in North America. With an Anglo-
Cherokee alliance, the Cherokee nation provided a necessary buffer zone between the opposing 
imperial powers. South Carolina did not solely focus on the Overhill region, but the political 
influence of Chota’s headmen and their willingness to accept foreigners in their town made the 
region’s loyalty crucial to maintaining the nation’s allegiance. In the late 1750s, Chota is a 
second example of the declining strength of Cherokee regionalism under growing political 
tensions with the English. Chota’s regional identity fundamentally influenced the tensions 
between the Cherokee nation and South Carolina but faded behind a more nationalized outlook.  
 
The Cosmopolitan Capital and the Trouble with Tellico 
 Leading up to the Anglo-Cherokee War, Indian, Virginian, and French visitors to Chota 
brought unique demonstrations of regionalism that challenged the strength and stability of the 
Cherokee-South Carolina alliance. Native American visitors were often in the French interest or 
hostile towards England’s Indian allies. Their presence was an issue throughout the decade. 
Virginians among the Overhills was an issue for South Carolina’s monopoly on the Cherokee 
trade. Overhill headmen were able to use this lack of colonial unity to their advantage. Chota’s 
acceptance of foreign emissaries created a cosmopolitan identity for the town and region. Within 
Chota, it was common for visitors from multiple nationalities to be visiting the town. The 
geographic location of Chota made this possible and the extent to which emissaries from other 
nationalities visited the nation was unparalleled by any other Cherokee town. Foreigners’ 
presence in Chota contributed to the town’s regional identity as a cosmopolitan capital city. The 
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headmen also faced challenges to their influence in the Cherokee nation because of their 
negotiations with the English. The presence of French emissaries was the greatest threat to the 
Anglo-Cherokee alliance of the era and deeply concerned South Carolina. Chota headmen 
maintained their alliances with the English but other Overhill towns challenged Chota’s 
influence in an intra-regional struggle. The Overhill region’s location made the foreign 
emissaries visits possible. The Cherokee and Anglo-American responses to their presence 
elicited expressions of political regionalism that intensified Anglo-Cherokee tensions. 
First, Indians from surrounding tribes frequently brought bad talks, distrust, and 
occasionally war. To understand and resolve these issues, Chota’s headmen used political 
regionalism. Eighteenth century Cherokees and Euro-Americans commonly labeled Indian 
visitors to Chota and the greater Cherokee nation as “Norward Indians.”11 Generally, the 
documents do not distinguish the tribal association of Norward Indians. The term applied to 
many different tribes, typically allied with the French, including the Savannah or Shawnee, the 
Nottoway, the Cayuga, and the Iroquois Confederacy or Six Nations. Occasionally, the 
documents make distinctions, however, at times they are contradictory. Other visitors to Chota 
and the Cherokee nation included the Catawba and Creek Indians. Since Chota offered the 
protection of diplomatic immunity, it was the primary destination for indigenous non-Cherokee 
visitors.  
                                                        
11 The term “Norward Indians” is used extensively in the documentary record of the era. In 
William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., Documents Relating to Indian Affars, May 21, 1750–August 7, 
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 In the first half of the decade, Chota’s open door tradition became an international 
concern. As early as February 1753, Governor Glen of South Carolina had designs for a peace 
settlement between the Cherokee and their traditional enemy the Creek.12 Governor Glen 
convened a council concerning the colony’s Indian affairs that lasted from May 28 to August 23, 
1753. While in council with headmen from Chota and other Cherokee towns, Glen told the 
headmen “that the cheif Thing for which I sent for you was to conclude a Peace with the 
Creeks,” and that topic dominated the day’s session.13 Chota approval of an established peace 
was paramount for South Carolina’s goal. During the council’s negotiations and correspondence 
with Old Hop in Chota, the Overhill Cherokees practiced a form of regional diplomacy.14 
 The Overhill Cherokee brought their regional perspective to the negotiations. Their 
neighbors, the Savannah, or Shawnee Indians, were at odds with South Carolina since the colony 
was holding some Shawnee prisoners. Throughout the Overhill Cherokee’s negotiations with 
South Carolina, Overhill headmen repeatedly broached the issue of the Shawnee prisoners. A 
Cherokee peace with the Creek was not disconcerting to the Shawnee. However, the Overhills 
understood that working with South Carolina while they held Shawnee prisoners would appear to 
the Shawnee as collusion between the Overhills and their tribesmen’s captors. An association 
with South Carolina was a detriment to the Overhills’ otherwise friendly relations with the 
neighboring Shawnee. Cooperation with South Carolina would be especially injurious to their 
relationship with the Shawnee because the English were reportedly holding the prisoners in 
                                                        
12 Ludwick Grant to Governor Glen, February 8, 1753, in DRIA II, 367. 
13 Thursday, A.M., the 5th Day of July, 1753, in DRIA I, quote on 436, 436-446. 
14 Councils are a major component of Richard White’s middle ground and it is for the 
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norms of a uniform peace with the Creeks, instead of the traditional regional peace 
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Chota.15 This unique regional component steered the Overhill Cherokee’s negotiations of a 
Creek peace with South Carolina. 
 Overhill regional diplomacy during the 1753 council took two forms. The first appears as 
Old Hop and other Overhill headmen showing a general disregard for the issue of peace with the 
Creek. Old Hop told an Overhill delegation before setting out for the council “to make Haste 
down with our People, to [Governor Glen], and to attend to what [Glen] should say about 
Matters of white People and our Trade, but to give no Answer as to Peace with the Creeks, but to 
leave that Matter to,” him.16 Old Hop’s desire slowed the diplomatic process and so did his 
representatives in Charleston. The delegation avoided discussion of the issue in council. Since 
the peace was Glen’s primary concern, he was forced to reiterate to the Cherokee that in regard 
to the peace, “There are other Things proper to be mentioned, but as you have not fully answered 
that Point, if you have any Thing else to say I am ready to hear you.”17 The Overhill Cherokee 
might not have actually been concerned with a Creek peace because traditionally, their approval 
was unnecessary. The English requirements for peace required the approval of the Cherokee 
nation and not just the involved region.18  
 Old Hop’s diplomatic faculties suggest the aforementioned form of regional diplomacy 
was not the primary motivation for his hesitancy. He was most likely deliberately feigning the 
first form to protect the Overhill towns from potential backlash from the neighboring Savannah 
Indians. During the 1753 council in Charleston, South Carolina was holding two Savannah 
prisoners for the murder of a white man in their country. The Creek Indian, King Tom, in Chota, 
                                                        
15 3rd Day of July, 1753, in DRIA I, 432-433. 
16 Wednesday, A.M., the 4th Day of July, 1753 in DRIA I, 433-436, quote on 435. 
17 Thursday, A.M., the 5th Day of July, 1753, in DRIA I, 436-446, quote on 436. 
18 Primarily the Lower Towns. 
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reportedly saw the prisoners in Chota.19 If the reports were true, the Chota headmen would have 
been familiar with their presence and probably their intentions. Without the release of the 
prisoners, the Savannah might attack Overhill settlements as the closest English allies, or cause 
diplomatic issues by traveling through the Cherokee nation to attack English settlements or their 
other allies. Due to this awareness, the Overhill Cherokee repeatedly broached this issue while in 
council with Governor Glen. On July 3, a planter named Morgan Sabb aspired to give his 
account of the Savannah prisoners to the governor. During Sabb’s council, Glen called for Little 
Carpenter’s presence. Upon his arrival, Little Carpenter told Glen that the Savannah Indians 
were in the French interest. Additionally, if the governor would not execute the prisoners, his 
delegation would “carry them back to their own Country, and acquaint the Head Men of their 
Town how Matters are,” and that the Cherokee would “take care that they shall no more come 
into your Settlements.”20 Two days later, an Overhill Cherokee named Long Jack initiated 
further discussion on the Savannah prisoners. Glen told Long Jack and Little Carpenter that the 
prisoners were caught trying to capture their own prisoners in South Carolinian settlements. 
Despite this knowledge, Long Jack and Little Carpenter continued to speak of the Savannah’s 
friendly intentions towards the Overhills and even threatened to cease the pursuit of a peace with 
the Creek.21 By the spring of 1754, the Cherokee and Creek were at peace, but Old Hop’s 
designs had only momentarily prevented his fears. 
 The Overhill Cherokee were warring with the French-backed Savannah Indians shortly 
after their failure to secure the release of the prisoners. By July of 1754, South Carolinians 
labeled the conflict with French Indians a general war and stated that the enemy infested the 
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region, and even mentioned a rumor that the Chickasaw were going to resettle among the 
Overhill Cherokee because of the war.22 Therefore, the war opened up the possibility of hostile 
Indians as well as refugees moving into the Overhill region. This situation is exactly what Old 
Hop was trying to avoid. The norward Savanah visited Chota peacefully before the prisoner 
quagmire as French representatives. South Carolina’s handling of the situation brought the 
French Indians upon the Cherokee and Old Hop understood this. Old Hop wrote to Governor 
Glen on behalf of all of the Overhill towns in September of 1754. The message pleads for 
shipments of desperately needed ammunition to fight the French-allied Savannahs. Old Hop also 
explicitly places the blame for these hostilities on South Carolina’s unwillingness to release the 
Savannah prisoners from the previous year.23 
Old Hop clearly understood the geopolitical circumstances surrounding South Carolina’s 
1753 council on Indian affairs. Despite the Savannah’s previously friendly talks and the potential 
backlash for the Overhills’ failure to secure the colony’s release of the prisoners, Old Hop still 
did not turn to the French against the English. Rather, his decisions resulted in the French 
Indians’ attacks on the Overhills and other English allies. The French offers were either too 
unreliable or insufficient to convert Old Hop, or the English promises too great to risk losing. 
Regardless of which was the greater influence on Old Hop, he was acting in the best interests of 
the Overhills. He was attempting to prevent war with the norward Savannah. This was primarily 
an Overhill concern because of the region’s proximity to the hostile Indians. The growing war 
with the French Indians brought Virginia into Chota’s purview.  
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Second, the war’s demand for ammunition led the Cherokee to consider an alternative 
source of trade with Virginia. The budding Cherokee-Virginia relationship threatened South 
Carolina’s monopolistic trading alliance and brought diplomatic confusion to the Anglo-
Cherokee relationship. The political discord between South Carolina, Virginia, and their 
respective governors created a chaotic situation. The Overhill Cherokee used political 
regionalism to maximize their gains and their negotiations now had continental consequences. 
The conflict with the French Indians stressed the Overhill Cherokee’s limited supplies of 
ammunition and had a significant human cost. The Cherokee had previously sent overtures to the 
Virginians in search of trade in 1751. This earlier attempt faced strong opposition in 
Charleston.24 Glen’s actions to prevent Virginian usurpation of Cherokee trade illustrated the 
substantial impact that regionalism had on Glen’s Cherokee diplomacy. The Overhills’ 
diplomacy with Virginia further exposes regionalism’s ability to foster instability between the 
Cherokee and South Carolina. 
The French and Indian War, starting in early 1754, quickly superseded the Overhill 
Cherokee conflict with the norward French Indians. The imperial necessity of maintaining the 
Cherokee buffer zone against France and its Indian allies prompted Governor Dinwiddie of 
Virginia to send trade overtures to Old Hop in Chota.25 The efforts of the Governors of Virginia 
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and South Carolina left Old Hop dissatisfied. Dinwiddie’s letter brought talks of trade but it did 
not deliver any immediately needed ammunition. Disillusioned by Glen’s failures, Old Hop 
informed the governor, “That he would not write for Ammunition again, because he had been 
disappointed before.”26 Glen realized the two plausible outcomes–the Cherokees ally with France 
or Virginia supplants South Carolina in the Cherokee trade–did not reflect the desired success of 
his Indian diplomacy. Governor Glen chose a third option. He agreed to meet a large Cherokee 
delegation led by Old Hop half way between their respective cities, Charleston and Chota, at 
Saluda Old Town. 
 The Saluda Conference of 1755 was important because Governor Glen’s regional 
diplomacy results in Chota’s apparent capriciousness in the following years. During the 
negotiations at Saluda, Glen promised the Cherokee with an Overhill fort and trade goods, while 
seeking total English sovereignty over the Cherokee.27 The Saluda Conference failed to achieve 
its goals. The negotiations withheld Cherokee support of Virginian military expeditions against 
the French which further pit the English against the French and increased tensions between 
Virginia and South Carolina. For historian Michael P. Morris, the Cherokee’s actions exemplify 
his understanding that “Intercolonial and international rivalries… empowered various tribes to 
make their own trade demands.” 28 This diplomatic strength, however, also turned into a major 
source of confusion.  
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Examinations of the conference recognize its importance to Anglo-Cherokee relations but 
fail to fully acknowledge the role of regionalism.29 The Cherokee and English use of regional 
politics fundamentally influenced the outcome of the conference, whose ramifications persisted 
through the decade. John Oliphant’s Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier offers the 
most thorough examination.30 However, Oliphant does not view the regionally induced political 
factionalism among the Cherokee and South Carolinians as the key to understanding their 
relationship. Oliphant primarily examines the treaty’s effects on the Cherokee-South Carolina 
relationship. Examining regionalism’s influence on the treaty’s creation helps explain why the 
Cherokee and South Carolina agreed to such lofty and unattainable terms at the conference, 
whereas, for Oliphant, they sign the treaty and he explains its failures between 1755 and 1758. 
His thorough examination of the treaty’s fallout makes the initial pact seem incomprehensible, 
but the lens of regionalism explains why both parties made such a troublesome treaty.  
 The conference between Governor Glen and Old Hop produced the Treaty of Saluda on 
July 2, 1755. One of Glen’s greatest concerns was the Cherokee acknowledgement of British 
sovereignty while the Chota triumvirate’s primary concerns were trade and the construction of an 
Overhill fort.31 The treaty meant to give both parties exactly what they wanted. Historians have 
overwhelmingly focused on this aspect of the conference. They examine the mystery of treaty’s 
actual terms, Glen’s misrepresentation of the treaty, and its failure to settle other issues between 
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the Cherokee and South Carolina.32 Despite the actual agreements made in the treaty, its lofty 
endeavors went unfulfilled. Other imperial officials and the South Carolina Commons House of 
Assembly still widely recognized the Cherokee nation as independent and trade disputes 
remained commonplace.33 The treaty’s failure to accomplish South Carolina’s and the 
Cherokee’s primary goals reveals the importance of regionalism in Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy. 
 The fear of Virginian encroachment on the Cherokee trade was the principal influence on 
Glen during the Saluda Conference. Historians view the decision to meet at Saluda primarily as a 
Cherokee assertion of sovereignty by insisting on equal terms for the diplomatic negotiations.34 
Governor Glen was not particularly averse to traveling for Cherokee diplomacy when necessary, 
having supervised Fort Prince George’s construction personally. The ease with which Glen 
acquiesced to the Cherokee desire to meet half way was a reflection of the strength of 
regionalism on Glen’s politics. Rather than Glen’s agreement to Saluda as an acceptance of the 
Cherokee sovereignty he hoped to dismantle, as some historians suggest, he was actually 
attempting to out maneuver Virginia diplomatically. Facing political failure, the choice was the 
governor’s last chance effort to maintain the Cherokee-South Carolina alliance and his political 
honor, as well as Carolina’s trading monopoly. The astute diplomat Old Hop realized South 
Carolina’s desperation and opportunistically forewent a trip to Charleston for one to Saluda. He 
might also have been using the refusal to meet at Charleston to gauge Glen’s response to better 
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judge the truthfulness of the governor’s talks. Glen’s acceptance of meeting at Saluda was more 
accurately his attempt to thwart his rivals than his recognition of Cherokee sovereignty.35  
 After the signing of the Treaty of Saluda in 1755, South Carolina, and its newly 
appointed Governor, William Henry Lyttelton, initially failed to deliver upon Glen’s promises. 
Trading issues between the Cherokee and South Carolina remained unsolved. The new system 
aimed to reduce competition, but abusive traders, most significantly in Chota and Great Tellico, 
undermined the effort.36 In regards to securing funding for Fort Loudon, Glen, and later 
Lyttelton, was destined for failure. Governor Glen was pivotal in convincing the Board of Trade 
and the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Thomas Robinson, to appropriate funds 
for the fort. However, Robinson made Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia the “administrator of the 
fund, with instructions to cooperate with Glen in building the fort.”37 Due to Glen’s failure to 
secure sufficient funding from the Crown’s budget or the Assembly, South Carolina’s 
construction of an Overhill fort stalled. 
 Dinwiddie in Virginia was nominally following the Crown’s directives. Of the budgeted 
£10,000, Dinwiddie allocated £1,000 to Glen.38 As Glen scrambled, Dinwiddie constructed a 
crude Virginian Overhill fort, completing the Crown’s task of building the Cherokee fort in July 
1756.39 For the English Crown, distinguishing between which colony built the Overhill fort was 
irrelevant. However, for the Cherokee, Virginia’s fort did not fulfill South Carolina’s promise for 
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a fort. The Cherokee approached the situation in the context of the Treaty of Saluda and Glen’s 
promise of a South Carolinian fort. 
For the Chota triumvirate, obtaining a fort from South Carolina was an important issue. 
Since Glen formally promised a fort with the Saluda treaty, failing to obtain the fort would 
undermine the headmen’s diplomatic influence in the Cherokee nation. The Overhill headmen 
used political regionalism to maximize their gains. Using their regional autonomy, Chota 
headmen pitted the colonial rivals against each other while also seeking the best possible 
outcome for their region. Dinwiddie’s Overhill fort was a charade and only built to gain 
Cherokee military service. Virginia did not send troops to build the fort but common laborers 
because Dinwiddie had no intention to garrison the fortification.40 By August, Captain Demere, 
the South Carolina officer charged with supervising and commanding the Overhill fort, was 
actively making progress towards fulfilling former-Governor Glen’s promise. Major construction 
on the fort began in October and finished in December of 1756, while improvements continued 
well into 1757.41 Regardless of their condition, Old Hop’s ability to get two colonial rivals to 
build forts in the region was a diplomatic success. By exacerbating the regional factionalism of 
the South Carolina-Virginia rivalry through South Carolina’s fear that its rival was “building a 
Fort… with a View of ingrossing the Trade to themselves,” Old Hop was able to buy Chota time 
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to explore all of its options.42 South Carolina’s repeated shortcomings in executing their 
promises turned Chota’s focus towards Virginia.  
South Carolina learned of Virginia’s design to leave their fort without a garrison and their 
failure to supply adequate munitions meant that they might be able to further stall in building 
their fort. To expedite the Carolinian endeavor, the Chota triumvirate began a campaign 
pressuring Governor Dinwiddie, even before the fort’s completion, to supply a garrison of one 
hundred Virginian troops.43 While the Cherokee actually did desire a Virginian garrison, they 
were also familiar with the colonial rivalry. The Cherokee were also aware of the potential 
benefits a garrisoned Virginian fort would bring in obtaining trade from that colony. At this 
moment though, Virginia was more concerned with protecting its backcountry than opening 
trading relations through a garrison in the Cherokee nation. 
Virginia expected Cherokee assistance in the war against the French and their Indian 
allies, but the Cherokees remained too inadequately supplied to go to war. Throughout 1756, the 
Overhill Cherokees continuously requested more ammunition for the war effort, but Virginia was 
under the impression that South Carolina would supply it.44 The confusion surrounding 
supplying the Cherokee nation with goods made French overtures to the Overhills more alluring. 
Finally, the French presence in Chota brought further expressions of regionalism and the 
greatest threat to the stability of the Cherokee-South Carolina alliance. France carried the weight 
of an imperial crisis for English interests in the North American southeast. The factionalism of 
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the Cherokee’s three party relationship with South Carolina and Virginia allowed France to 
increase their influence among the Overhills. 
Chota was not a hotbed of French support, but the town’s leaders welcomed the 
overtures. French representatives and Indian allies visited Chota in 1756 in hopes of stealing the 
Cherokee’s allegiance from the English.45 The Chota Triumvirate split on the French issue as the 
Little Carpenter was committed to building strong relations with Virginia. Meanwhile, Old Hop 
maintained correspondence with the French and found a Franco-alliance increasingly tempting.46 
Examining the impact of French visitors on the Overhill Cherokees reveals another level of 
factionalism that complicated the Cherokee-South Carolina relationship. 
The French found their strongest support in the Overhill town of Great Tellico. The town 
had previously challenged Chota’s role as the Cherokee capital and saw the French as their 
opportunity to reclaim that status. The English also pushed the town towards the French interest 
when Demere carried out an unprovoked raid on French-allied Shawnee emissaries visiting 
Tellico in June 1756.47 The town continued to allow the French presence and began petitioning 
Chota to the French interest.  
On December 8, 1756, Captain Demere, alarmed about Tellico visitors at Chota, wrote to 
Governor Lyttelton. Demere was worried about the gifts that the French offered the Cherokees 
and believed that the Cherokees would soon have to choose a side.48 Earlier, Old Hop had told 
Demere that the enemies of the English were his and the Cherokee nation’s enemies.49 Tellico’s 
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continued engagement with the French imbued Demere’s later distrust.  Chota and Old Hop’s 
failure to make a clear decision on the French issue led to many rumors in the Cherokee nation. 
One was that the towns of Tellico and Chatuga were disbanding and settling with the 
French.50Another was that Old Hop was taking part in a plot to attack Fort Loudon.51 As early as 
January of 1757, Tellico began turning back towards the English, but the Tellico-French 
connection remained throughout the year.52 As the Cherokee nation drifted towards war with the 
English in 1758, the French presence in the Overhills again became an important issue for the 
region, the Cherokee nation, and Anglo-America. 
Foreigners in Chota were a reflection of Cherokee regionalism. The town’s intramontane 
location allowed Overhill Cherokee regionally specific opportunities and challenges. Native 
American visitors to Chota delayed peace with the Creek Indians. They also represented a unique 
threat to the security of the Overhill region. Virginians, as a second representative of the English 
Crown, brought confusion to the Anglo-Cherokee alliance. South Carolina and Virginia both 
sought the Cherokee as an ally against the French and their Indian allies, but competition 
between the two hampered clear diplomatic relations. Lastly, Chota’s distance from Charleston 
allowed the town to look beyond South Carolina and Virginia for Euro-American allies. A 
French presence in Chota and other Overhill towns was common and exposed divisions within 
the region. 
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The Descent to War 
 Regionalism permeated the Overhill Cherokee and Chota’s participation in France and 
England’s imperial French and Indian War. Old Hop and the Overhills initially bought the 
Cherokee nation time. By playing South Carolina and Virginia against each other the Cherokee 
were able to avoid plunging into the conflict themselves. The Little Carpenter then commits the 
nation to an alliance with Virginia for the benefit of the Overhills. Overhill regionalism, 
however, also limited the region’s participation in the Little Carpenter’s commitment. Due to 
various issues with the Cherokee’s participation in the Virginian campaigns of the late 1750s, the 
Anglo-Cherokee alliance falters. Once war breaks out between the Cherokee nation and South 
Carolina, Chota became the focus of the Cherokee’s political shift from regional factionalism to 
ideological factionalism.  
 The issue of war divided the Cherokee people. Across the entire nation, the Cherokee 
split into pro-English accomodationist and pro-war nativist factions. Since this new division in 
Cherokee politics occurred in all of the nation’s regions, it diminished the strength of regional 
divisions. The war caused a shift in Cherokee politics from regional factionalism towards 
national ideological issues. Due to the diplomatic importance of Chota’s headmen, the town’s 
shift to ideological factionalism was particularly important.   
 Old Hop and the other Chota headmen were able to exploit the South Carolina-Virginia 
rivalry in the mid-1750s. After the Saluda Conference, Cherokee diplomatic power coalesced 
around Old Hop and Chota.53 Old Hop was using his diplomatic acumen to prevent the Cherokee 
nation from entering binding and burdensome alliances while exploring all possible alternatives. 
The Saluda Treaty weakly bound the Cherokees to South Carolina and in March 1756, the Little 
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Carpenter negotiated the Treaty of Broad River with Virginia. The agreement called for four 
hundred Cherokee warriors to assist Virginia in exchange for munitions, gifts, and an Overhill 
fort. The treaty was advantageous for the Little Carpenter and other Overhill Cherokees. For the 
Overhill leaders, Broad River assuaged South Carolina’s diplomatic shortcomings resulting from 
the Treaty of Saluda. It was also an opportunity to break from South Carolina’s trade 
monopoly.54 The Overhill headmen failed to realize the regionally specific byproducts of the 
Saluda and Broad River Treaties. 
 The Cherokee nation supplied auxiliaries to Virginia’s campaigns in 1757 and 1758, 
however, disproportionately few warriors came from the Overhill settlements. While Old Hop 
and Chota maintained a relationship with the French and their Indian allies, the Saluda and Broad 
River Treaties kept the Cherokee in the English interest. This meant that the intramontane 
Overhill towns were vulnerable to French-allied attacks from the Savannah and other northern 
Indians.55 The previous section highlighted the Overhills’ diplomatic advantage with regards to 
foreign emissaries, but the same accessibility brought the regionally specific challenge of French 
supported raids.  
 Between 1756 and 1758, France and their Indian allies ravaged the English backcountry 
in Virginia and the Cherokee Overhill region. The French threat necessitated that Overhill 
warriors remained at home for protection. Due to this, the Lower Towns primarily supplied the 
Cherokee auxiliary warriors for Virginia in 1757.56 For the backcountry settlers of Virginia, the 
sight of traveling Cherokee warriors in full military regalia was unsettling. Since 1754, the 
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French-allied Shawnee devastated the Virginia backcountry. Raids in which the French Indians 
took captives were common throughout 1756 and 1757.57 For the Cherokee, the most important 
factor of the enemies’ raids was the fear they instilled among white settlers. The fear of raids and 
capture by enemy Indians prompted tens of thousands of backcountry settlers to seek safety in 
the east. The fear of an Indian attack paralyzed the white settlers that remained in the 
backcountry.58  
The treaties signed at Saluda and Broad River by the Overhill Cherokee profoundly 
affected Anglo-Cherokee relations in the late 1750s. The treaties created the ideal situation for 
the deterioration of the Cherokee’s alliance with the English. Chota’s display of regional 
interests put Cherokee warriors from the entire nation on the warpath straight through the 
Virginia backcountry full of settlers terrified of Indians.  
Through 1758, the Cherokee maintained their tenuous relationship with the English. By 
1757, the South Carolinian Cherokee trader, Ludovick Grant feared that the Cherokees might 
murder the English traders and ally with France.59 During this time, the Little Carpenter suffered 
major political setbacks. He was blamed for the Treaty of Broad River’s inability to deliver the 
agreed upon goods. This failure helped create a nativist faction in favor of retaliation for 
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murdered Cherokees in the Overhill Towns. By 1759, the results of Overhill headmen’s 
regionalism led to war with the English and a major shift in internal Cherokee politics. 
Before 1759, regional factionalism was the primary division within Cherokee diplomacy 
but this gave way to ideological factionalism. The new fissure over retaliation and war with the 
English split the Cherokee nation into nativist and accomodationist factions. The Little Carpenter 
was a leading headman in the accomodationist camp and believed in the possibility of settling 
the Cherokee’s issues with the English. In April 1759, the Little Carpenter and a party of fifty 
Cherokee men, women, and children travelled to Charleston to secure the Carolinian peace. He 
pledged to restrain the nation’s warriors from attacking English settlements.60 Despite the Little 
Carpenter’s promises, while he was in Charleston, Overhill Cherokees from Settico took their 
revenge on a string of English settlements in North Carolina.61 Other Cherokee regions 
disavowed the actions of the troublemakers.62 The Overhills debated the issue. 
Pragmatically, the Little Carpenter was without options. The English confusion of 
jurisdiction over Cherokee affairs allowed Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina to demand 
satisfaction for the Cherokee’s backcountry raids. Overhill headmen could not apprehend the 
guilty Cherokees because it would undermine their socially prescribed motivations to honor their 
dead, while failing to do so compromised the Little Carpenter’s diplomatic influence. The Little 
Carpenter’s inability to apprehend the perpetrators also made convincing Lyttelton to address 
other Cherokee concerns more difficult.63 Later in 1759, the Little Carpenter offered menial 
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support against French-allied Creek settlements near the Overhill region, but floundered 
politically. He was unable to gain supporters for an attack and the Slave-Catcher of Chota 
actually led an Overhill delegation to the Creek settlements and then to meet the French directly 
at Fort Toulouse.64 The Little Carpenter and the accomodationist faction were quickly losing 
ground in the Cherokee nation. 
Throughout 1759, the Cherokee retaliatory raids continued and the tensions between 
South Carolina and the Cherokee grew. The Slave-Catcher of Chota’s interactions with the 
French revealed that the French were not immediately prepared to supply the Cherokee. Without 
French support, a lasting war was only injurious for the Cherokee. The threat of diplomatic 
isolation restrained the Cherokee from attacking the English forts in their nation. It also explains 
the Chota headmen’s accomodationist attractions. The potential isolation led to an 
accomodationist political resurgence that generated a cross-regional peace delegation to 
Governor Lyttelton and South Carolina led by the Great Warrior of Chota. Lyttelton’s 
imprisonment of the delegation signaled the death knell of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance.  
With his prisoners detained in Fort Prince George at the Lower Cherokee town of 
Keowee, Governor Lyttelton’s attempts to restore peace inadvertently became the Cherokee call 
to arms. The Cherokee accomodationist faction’s fate was now the fate of the prisoners in Fort 
Prince George. In February 1760, the Little Carpenter, the Great Warrior of Chota, and the Little 
Raven made the final attempt at a diplomatic resolution, but ultimately failed.65 With Old Hop’s 
absence, two legs of the Chota Triumvirate were unable to resolve the hostage crisis. Only days 
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later, nativist Cherokees made a forceful attempt to free the prisoners. The attempt resulted in the 
massacre of the Cherokee prisoners and the breakdown of the accomodationist faction. 
The Chota headmen were unable to dissuade the Cherokee nation from war with the 
English. By January 1760, Middle and Lower Cherokee warriors raided South Carolina’s 
backcountry.66 Accomodationist headmen’s, and particularly the Little Carpenter’s, political 
influence was waning. The Chota Triumvirate was fracturing and shattered with Old Hop’s death 
in January 1760. After his death, the Little Carpenter and the Great Warrior’s political rivalry 
embodied the weakening of Cherokees’ regional identities under the pressure of potential war. 
As early as their return from Fort Prince George, the Great Warrior began condemning the 
accomodationist approach among the Lower Towns.67 For the Cherokee, the Great Warrior’s 
nativism filled the void left by Old Hop’s death. The nation, frustrated with his repeated failures, 
marginalized the Little Carpenter’s influence.68 
Due to Chota’s diplomatic importance and its headmen’s role as the nation’s diplomats, 
the fracturing of Cherokee society into accomodationist and nativist factions appears protracted 
in the documentary record. In the Lower and Middle Towns, the rise of the war faction occurred 
relatively quickly. Accomodationists and nativists were present throughout the Cherokee nation 
and certainly debated the definitive issue. The debate appears drawn out in Chota because of the 
diplomatic importance South Carolina placed on the town’s headmen. The English viewed the 
Little Carpenter as the emperor of the Cherokee nation even though the Great Warrior was the 
nation’s most influential headman.69 Both headmen were from Chota, and their importance to the 
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English made the town the center of the debate. Single-issue Cherokee factionalism dominated 
Anglo-Cherokee diplomacy in 1759 and 1760, but the influence of Cherokee regionalism 
remained.   
Even though issue-based factionalism was the primary influence on Cherokee diplomacy, 
regional factionalism nevertheless affected nativist actions. The Cherokee nation was at war with 
the English. Not all Cherokees participated or supported the war, but the involvement of every 
region made it a national war. Despite the conflict’s national participation, individual regions 
still carried out their own militaristic affairs. Lower Cherokee warriors invested Fort Prince 
George and raided South Carolina and the Middle Towns raided Georgia, while the Overhills 
besieged Fort Loudon and attacked English settlements in the North Carolina backcountry.70 
Tortora asserts that the Overhills’ decision to establish another front, instead of a single united 
front, is a reflection of “the way the Cherokees coordinated their efforts by village cluster.”71 He 
continues with a description of the Overhill’s “easy targets,” but stops short of asking why the 
Overhill Cherokee did not join the seemingly more organized Middle and Lower Towns’ 
offensive. This is important because when examined, the Overhill campaign does appear as part 
of a national Cherokee effort. 
Why the Overhill Cherokee attacked the relatively inconsequential North Carolinian 
outpost, Fort Dobbs, is a complex question, with an equally complex answer. Examining the 
Overhill’s decision within the context of Cherokee regionalism brings some clarity to their 
decision. The region’s headmen may have thought of Fort Dobbs as a threat to their towns. 
Another potential reason was for honor. Since the Lower and Middle Cherokees successfully 
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pushed the South Carolina frontier a hundred miles eastward, Overhill warriors may have seen 
the North Carolina settlements as an easier logistical opportunity to gain prestige, honor, and 
social advancement.72 Attacking the inadequately fortified, North Carolina backcountry meant 
the dispersed white settlers were vulnerable to Cherokee raids. Self-preservation, in the sense 
that defenseless targets would minimize Overhill casualties, may also have influenced the 
decision. These justifications help make sense of the decision, but do not fully explain it.  
The Overhill Cherokee did not venture south to attack the English because the Overhill 
towns were the Cherokee nation’s vanguard on their northern front. The Anglo-Cherokee War 
invited hostile attention from the English-allied Iroquois Confederacy from the north. The 
Iroquois inflicted heavy losses among the Overhills.73 Just as the Shawnee had limited Overhill 
involvement in the Virginia expeditions, Iroquois raids contained Overhill warriors to their 
northern region. Tortora oversimplifies the Overhill operations in North Carolina as traditional 
Cherokee efforts coordinated through “village clusters.”74 Instead of joining the offensive in 
Georgia and South Carolina, the Overhill Cherokee could have consciously made the decision to 
safeguard the rest of the nation from Iroquois advances. Thus, the nativist Cherokee faction led 
the nation to war but Overhill regionalism buttressed the Lower and Middle Towns ability to 
fight Georgia and South Carolina.75 
 
 
                                                        
72 Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 111. 
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75 The nativist’s faction rise to prominence, and the major shift from regional to ideological 
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nation. The nativist-accomodationist split in the Cherokee nation happened because of 
encounters with Euro-Americans on the frontier, see Hatley, The Dividing Paths, 80. 
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The Return to Peacetime Diplomacy 
 The Cherokee’s resounding military successes did not continue in 1760 and 1761. South 
Carolina regained control of the conflict and reestablished peaceful relations with the Cherokee 
by 1762. Unprecedented factional challenges saturated a renewed Anglo-Cherokee alliance. The 
Cherokee nation and the English Empire’s political worlds were both undergoing major changes. 
These changes exacerbated the difficulties of rectifying the Anglo-Cherokee alliance because of 
various Anglo-Cherokee factionalisms.  
During the Anglo-Cherokee War, the English conducted three expeditions into the 
Cherokee nation. The first was Governor Lyttelton’s feeble attempt to coerce peace from the 
Cherokees in which he brought their captives to Fort Prince George in 1759. The colonial press 
initially heralded Lyttelton’s expedition as a major victory but this action actually did little 
towards settling a lasting peace.76 At the head of over thirteen hundred troops in summer 1760, 
Archibald Montgomery led an expedition against the Cherokee Lower Towns. In a thirty-six 
hour period beginning on the morning of June 1, Montgomery’s troops burned five of the Lower 
Cherokee’s towns and killed or captured over one hundred Cherokees.77 Many of the Lower 
Cherokee fled to the Middle Towns as their hometowns lay in waste. Montgomery intended to 
carry his successful destruction into the Middle Towns on his way to relieve the besieged 
garrison at Fort Loudon. The Middle Cherokee used the advantage of their region’s steep 
mountainous geography to halt Montgomery’s advance. The Cherokee warriors succeeded and 
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sent his contingent on an abrupt, nocturnal retreat.78 Montgomery’s second in command, James 
Grant, was preparing to lead an expedition against the Cherokee in the spring of the following 
year. Grant’s campaign brought Montgomery’s destruction to the Middle Towns where he 
burned fifteen towns and their crops. These campaigns devastated the Cherokee nation. 
In 1761, the Cherokee nation lacked the logistical support to continue war and the South 
Carolina expeditions left many starving and their towns razed. Before Grant marched into the 
Middle Settlements, the Great Warrior and the Little Carpenter met Grant at Fort Prince George 
to establish peace. They were unable to agree to Grant’s demand of complete capitulation and the 
return of all white captives. The result was Grant’s campaign sought a display of force great 
enough to discredit the war faction and seize control of peace negotiations.79 Grant’s success had 
a profound impact on the Cherokee nation. 
South Carolina’s Cherokee offensive of 1761 ensured the diplomatic primacy of Chota 
despite its headmen’s years of diplomatic failures. With the destruction of the Lower and Middle 
Towns in subsequent years, only the Overhill region remained intact. This continuity help ensure 
that Chota headmen would retain their influence because they were in charge of solving the crisis 
of their starving nation. The Cherokee went unsupplied, isolated, and starving, and necessarily 
formed a refugee camp near Fort Prince George. This meant Grant had successfully made war 
untenable for the Cherokee.80 
 Factionalism remained prevalent in the negotiations for a renewed Anglo-Cherokee 
peace. It took months of negotiation between the Cherokee and South Carolina to settle peace 
terms. Beginning in August 1761, the Little Carpenter and Grant agreed to an initial settlement, 
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but Grant had many opponents in Charleston who believed he was weak and inept, and that his 
terms were too generous.81 By November, the Little Carpenter was in Charleston to confirm the 
unpopular treaty, but Overhill headmen were already looking for more favorable provisions from 
Virginia.82 
Disenchanted with the Little Carpenter’s negotiations with South Carolina, other Overhill 
headmen sought a treaty with Virginia that would materially benefit the Cherokee nation. The 
Great Warrior, Standing Turkey, and the Mankiller of Tellico met with Colonel Adam Stephen 
of Virginia on the Great Island of the Holston as the Little Carpenter dealt with South Carolina. 
Negotiations were quick for the Overhill headmen. By November 20, they had secured a 
Virginian treaty with generous terms. The Cherokee headmen would denounce war and make a 
firm peace. They would also give up the Cherokees, or the scalps of individuals, who murdered 
Virginians. The second term was actually lenient because there was no time limit or other 
conditions, and Cherokees could attempt to use any Indians’ scalp for the term’s fulfillment.83 
The Treaty of Long-Island-on-the-Holston was an Overhill success, and signed before South 
Carolina formalized their treaty with the Little Carpenter. 
Factionalism permeated the treaties’ negotiations and their outcomes. The Lower Towns 
lost significant tracts of hunting grounds in the Treaty of Charleston.84 The Little Carpenter’s 
support among the Cherokee was declining because of the issue of land. The Little Carpenter 
was happy to accept the new boundary lines instead of those agreed upon initially.85 He also 
                                                        
81 Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 174-178; Tortora, Carolina in 
Crisis, 159. 
82 Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 165. 
83 Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 165. 
84 Even with some colonial concessions, the loss of land was noteworthy, Oliphant, Peace and 
War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 180-182. 
85 Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 186. 
 97 
hedged against the Lower Towns diminishing support by becoming Grant’s de facto puppet 
emperor, despite refusing the actual title.86 Cherokee regionalism in the Lower Towns 
dissatisfaction with the treaty was one of the reason ambitious Overhill headmen skirted the 
Little Carpenter’s efforts to seek better terms from Virginia.  
The Treaty of Long-Island-on-the-Holston was the direct result of colonial regionalism 
because of Virginia and South Carolina’s colonial rivalry. Virginia’s lenient and quick resolution 
for peace was a calculated political maneuver. The news of the Cherokee’s prolonged 
negotiations in Charleston shocked Virginia. Understanding the opportunity, it acted quickly. 
The expedited diplomacy allowed Virginia the opportunity of envisioning their post-war trading 
success and domination.87 Virginia’s opportunity stemmed from South Carolina’s internal 
factionalism. 
The delay in signing the Treaty of Charleston was due to an internal division within 
South Carolina. Grant was the British commander in South Carolina and during his tenure 
openly criticized provincial militias. His attitudes engendered malcontent from South 
Carolinians. The colonial legislature wanted a stringent settlement that would include Cherokee 
executions.88 Grant believed that the critical issue of the peace settlement was reestablishing trust 
among the Cherokee.89 For Grant this meant offering favorable terms, but the legislature whose 
settlements and citizens were victims of the war sought to punish the Cherokee. The legislature’s 
influence was strong enough to keep acting royal governor, William Bull, from supporting the 
British commander.90 Grant was eventually able to persuade South Carolina that executions were 
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an unattainable settlement term, but the prolonged negotiations had already done their damage. 
South Carolina’s political factionalism allowed Virginia’s treaty with the Cherokee. Both the 
prolonged negotiations and the meager concessions of South Carolina convinced the Overhill 
Cherokee that a better deal lay with the colonial leaders of Virginia.  
Although Chota’s headmen and the English colonies restored peace on the Anglo-
Cherokee frontier, the overall status of this region remained precarious. Settlers’ encroachment 
from South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia on Cherokee lands remained a source of 
Anglo-Cherokee tensions and bred discontent among colonials towards the English Crown.91 The 
Cherokee were no longer in a position to resist the English. The Cherokee nation’s headmen split 
into pro-South Carolina, pro-Virginia, and pro-French factions, but diplomatic victories eluded 
them. By 1762, regional and political factionalisms helped guide the Cherokee and English 
towards the Anglo-Cherokee War which left the Cherokee nation in a remarkably diminished 
state. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
The Cherokee nation in 1762 was unrecognizable from its 1750 self. During this twelve-
year period, the Cherokee nation fought various wars with neighboring Indians, South Carolina, 
Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and the French. The wars complicated the long decade’s 
diplomatic relations. Chota headmen, representing the Cherokee nation, negotiated three treaties 
with South Carolina alone–the Treaty of 1751, the Treaty of Saluda in 1755, and the Treaty of 
Charleston in 1761.1 The Cherokees signed additional treaties with Virginia and the French. The 
internecine warfare and pursuant diplomatic struggles defined the era. 
Throughout all of the long decade’s affairs, internal factionalism among the Cherokees 
and Anglo-Americans stifled a healthy and lasting Anglo-Cherokee alliance. The major 
development for the Cherokee nation during the era was the shift from regional factionalism to 
ideological factionalism. Before 1759, regionalism was the Cherokee’s primary diplomatic 
division. The period leading up to the Anglo-Cherokee War divided the nation into pro-war 
nativist and reconciliatory accomodationist factions. The Cherokee nation’s shift towards issue-
based factionalism brought greater national unity among the regional factions. This was a 
significant change in Cherokee politics. Regionalism once defined Cherokee politics but their 
diplomacy grew increasingly national in scope because the dividing issue of war crossed regional 
lines. Cherokee diplomacy for the first time meaningfully united the different regions instead of 
the regions causing diplomatic discord. This places the origins of Cherokee political 
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centralization in the early 1760s instead of the generally understood period immediately 
following the American Revolution. The change also increased confusion and created new 
diplomatic challenges. Additionally, regionalism still persisted and maintained some of its 
influence on Cherokee diplomatic affairs. The complexity of Anglo-American politics mirrored 
the Cherokee’s factionalism. 
Between 1750 and 1762, the English in North America had similar political fissures as 
the Cherokee nation. The rivalries between individual colonies and their governors were similar 
to the Cherokee’s regional factionalism. Sometimes these divisions proved beneficial to the 
Cherokees, as they were able to play one off the other. The English attempts to centralize Indian 
affairs only produced further diplomatic confusion. The factionalism between the English Crown 
and its colonials, although regional in nature, more closely resembled the Cherokees’ issue-based 
factionalism. This colonial factionalism appears repeatedly throughout the 1750s. It manifests 
itself in the struggles of various royal governors of South Carolina, the crown’s military 
commanders, and Indian superintendents with the colonial legislature. Just as Cherokee 
factionalism contributed to the era’s diplomatic volatility. 
The various factionalisms prevalent among the Cherokees and English between 1750 and 
1762 created the long decade’s turbulence. The Chota headmen and the various English 
representatives they negotiated with were at no point representative of their entire respective 
nations. Examining the era through the lens of the Cherokees’ and Anglo-Americans’ 
fragmentary identities can help us understand the outwardly irrational actions of the Cherokee 
nation and the English empire. 
By 1762, Keowee had grown from an average Lower town to the region’s most important 
town despite the ravages of war in the region. It also became the nation’s primary trading 
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location with South Carolina’s 1762, “Act to Regulate the Cherokee Trade.”2 The Overhill town, 
Chota, had cemented its position as the Cherokee nation’s leading diplomatic center as it quelled 
Great Tellico’s attempts to supplant it as such. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris and the 
end of the Seven Years’ War, England gained control of France’s American territories east of the 
Mississippi River and Canada, as well as Spain’s possessions in Florida.3 For the Cherokee 
nation, the North American landscape was fundamentally different in 1763 from only a decade 
earlier. 
From the Cherokee perspective of 1763, war was finally over and good trade relations 
were re-established with the only viable European power remaining in North America. It must 
have appeared that the Cherokee nation was in a position for the dawning of a golden age as a 
British Indian ally. The issue of encroaching backcountry settlement became the primary Anglo-
Cherokee diplomatic concern. However, King George III’s Royal Proclamation of 1763 
addressed this issue directly. It prohibited settlement in the Indian lands and ordered those 
already illegally settled there to remove themselves. Through diplomatic efforts such as this, 
England was able to foster alliances with the Indian peoples, including the Cherokee nation, in 
the continent’s next great conflict.  
According to Thomas Hatley, the establishment of the Indian boundary line was also 
important for colonial politics. With the new fixed border, the backcountry communities most 
affected by the Anglo-Cherokee war were able to turn their political attention back eastward and 
this contributed to the development of the Regulator Movement in 1767.4 While the Regulator 
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Movement focused on white colonial society, Hatley notes that Cherokee society influenced the 
movement’s cultural reforms.5 The Regulator Movement’s anti-Cherokee social reforms were 
not the most important aspect of the movement. 
For Anglo-Cherokee relations, the most important facet of the Regulator Movement was 
Euro-American’s willingness for intra-societal violence. According to Wayne E. Lee, the 
Regulators were attempting to maintain a sense of legitimacy to their protests and eventual 
violence. They were operating through socially prescribed escalations of violence and force.6 
The important aspect remains that colonial society was so easily able to reach the level of open, 
military violence. Even though the Regulator Movement did not draw the Cherokee into war, the 
next colonial conflict would.  
By the early 1770s, trouble was brewing on the Southern Indian frontier. Backcountry 
settlers grew increasingly upset with their colonial governments because the settlers believed 
they were in an “immoral alliance” with the Cherokees and Creeks.7 This contributed to a 
growing resentment between the backcountry settlers and the eastern governments. Between the 
1763 and the early 1770s, the backcountry population of South Carolina exploded. The 
Cherokees sought the assistance of the metropolitan authorities to protect their lands. However, 
South Carolina’s Commons House of Assembly and Lieutenant Governor Bull were conflicted 
with the situation. They knew that the English Empire could not afford another Indian war, but 
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the backcountry settlers protected the coastal regions from potential Cherokee attacks. The 
situation also contributed to growing tensions between the governor and the colonial assembly.8 
As the divide between pro and anti-British factions grew in the colonial south, both sides 
attempted to garner Cherokee support. Alarmed by loyalist attempts to court the Cherokees, the 
anti-British Whig faction established their own Indian Department in 1775, to explain to the 
Cherokees that British taxes also affected their ability to maintain the Cherokee trade.9 By 1775, 
it was clear that the Cherokee nation was going to have a role in the impending conflict as 
rumors and attempted munitions shipments proliferated.10 It was now clear that the peace made 
in 1763, would not last much more than a decade.  
As the Anglo-American crisis of the 1770s crawled toward revolutionary heights, it 
became clear that there would be some Cherokee involvement. The Cherokee nation’s 
participation followed a similar process. Just as the Cherokee nation split into accomodationist 
and nativist factions during the Anglo-Cherokee War during the 1750s and 1760s, the same 
divide emerged during the period leading up to the American Revolution.  
The swelling number of Anglo-American settlers encroaching on Cherokee lands led to 
peacetime land cessions. The most prominent was the Sycamore Shoals treaty of 1775, during 
which the Little Carpenter led an accomodationist faction willing to sell Cherokee land, while his 
son, Dragging Canoe, represented a nativist faction willing to fight for their land and found the 
treaty fraudulently signed by old men unable to represent the whole Cherokee nation.11 The 
Cherokee nation’s factionalism during the 1770s was more divisive than its earlier rift. Despite 
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this, Cherokee factionalism during the Seven Years’ War foreshadowed the Cherokee’s 
involvement during the American Revolution. 
The American Revolution did not actually divide the Cherokee nation into 
accomodationist and nativist factions. Rather, it intensified the division that already developed in 
the early 1760s. The Cherokee nation’s experience during the American Revolution was a 
continuation of the burgeoning political and diplomatic environment of the earlier conflict. 
Leading up to the Anglo-Cherokee War, the Cherokee nation was already drawing the factional 
lines between the accomodationists and the nativists. Eventually, the pro-war nativist faction 
drove the Cherokee nation to war with the British. As the nativists grew dominant, the Cherokee 
political landscape also began changing. The trans-regional nativist faction plunged the entire 
Cherokee nation into war. Before the Anglo-Cherokee War, individual regions made war and 
established peace independently. This war, however, is an early indication of the centralization 
of Cherokee political power.  
Generally, historians look at the Cherokee’s experience during the American Revolution 
as laying the foundations for nationalization. Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green begin their 
examination of the Cherokee Nation with the “civilization” efforts of the United States 
immediately following the Revolutionary War with the Cherokee’s “ultimate expression of 
nationalism” occurring “in 1827 with the drafting of the Nation’s constitution.”12 However, the 
Cherokee nation’s experiences during the 1750s and 1760s established the basic pattern of 
Cherokee centralization in the face of an overwhelming outside force. The diplomatic island the 
Cherokee nation found itself on during the Anglo-Cherokee War is the first time the nation 
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understood itself as a single united entity. While a Cherokee nation-state did not materialize until 
the early nineteenth century, the Anglo-Cherokee War planted its seed significantly earlier than 
the American Revolution. 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the Anglo-Cherokee War left the Cherokee nation 
diplomatically isolated. War with Anglo-America, and France unable or unwilling to offer 
support forced the Cherokee to view themselves in a more nationalistic sense. Daniel Tortora 
asserts that the Overhill Cherokee’s offensive campaign near Fort Dobbs in North Carolina 
during the war was a reflection of how “the Cherokees coordinated their efforts by village 
cluster.”13 However, the examination in chapter 3 reveals that the offensive makes more sense 
when interpreted as part of a national war effort. The origins of the Anglo-Cherokee and their 
actions during the conflict reveal that the political centralization of the Cherokee nation began in 
the early 1760s and much earlier than generally thought. 
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